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ABSTRACT 
Steven Vogel argues that nature ought not be thought of as a category independent of 
humans, and instead much be understood as something built by human action. His point is 
fundamentally ontological: Vogel denies that there is a difference in kind between the natural 
and artificial. To establish this, Vogel argues against two separate conceptions of nature which 
are popular in environmental discourse in order to show that both are problematic. The first 
definition "Nature(1)" is the notion of nature as the parts of the world not touched by humans; 
the second definition is "Nature(2)" which holds as natural anything which is physical. The 
former turns out to exclude all the things which humans know or encounter.  The latter 
captures too much to be useful in distinguishing the natural and non-natural. If nature just 
refers to the physical laws of the universe, nothing human beings do in the world can possibly 
threaten the natural. After refuting these two views, he concludes that nature must be 
understood not as a self-subsisting thing but as something socially constructed. 
 I argue that Vogel overlooks a third definition of nature which can be derived from 
Aristotle's notion of phusis and its subsequent development by the Aristotelian tradition, 
especially by St. Thomas Aquinas. I wish to clarify why Aristotle's notion of nature is distinct 
from those attacked by Vogel. Specifically, I believe that Aristotle's account is able to justify 
the ontological commitments it makes in contrast to either of the views Vogel criticizes. I will 
defend its relevance to contemporary environmental philosophy especially against the charge 
of ideology which Vogel makes against other conceptions of nature. 
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1 
CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM OF NATURE INTRODUCED 
Steven Vogel does not believe that the concept of nature as it is used in 
contemporary environmental discourse is useful as a category. He holds the concept 
is ambiguous and known to be ambiguous, and further posits that “perhaps it is the 
time to admit that the concept is ​too ​ambiguous, too confusing, too likely to issue in 
antinomies, perhaps even too intellectually seductive to be helpful in discussions of 
how human beings ought best to live in the world".  Vogel continues “the ​concept ​[of 1
nature] is hard to find as well, meaning that the definition of the term turns out to be 
so slippery that all attempts to pin it down seem equally doomed to failure".  In other 
2
words, there is ​no ​satisfactory definition of nature. 
In order to demonstrate this, Vogel will define and criticize two notions of 
nature; which he refers to as “nature” and “Nature” (a distinction I will explicate in 
the next chapter). For the sake of convenience, I have opted for the terms “Nature(1)” 
and “Nature(2)”. Nature(1) is fundamentally an emphasis on nature as 
“independent” in the broadest sense. Nature(2) is a description of nature as the 
“physical”, that is anything in the world governed by what one may call the “laws of 
nature”. Putting aside briefly the specific problems Vogel has with these two 
definitions, it is important now only to note that he rejects both.  
 Thus on account of the various problems Vogel raises, the two definitions are 
found to be useless for an environmental ethic (ie. they do not allow for a description 
of ​good ​action in respect to the natural environment). While Vogel concedes there 
have been other attempts to define nature, nevertheless in each case Vogel shows 
these other views to be reducible to or dependent upon Nature(1) or Nature(2). 
1
 Steven Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2015), 9. 
2
 ​Ibid​. 
2 
Consequently, Vogel concludes the traditional notion of nature needs to be 
abandoned.  
What Vogel believes he can accomplish by forsaking the notion of nature is the 
resolution of a particular, allegedly ontological, dichotomy which haunts 
contemporary environmental discussions. Vogel explains: “The distinction between 
the natural and the artificial is ontologically meaningless: this is the central point I 
am trying to make".  That is, the difference between what is commonly called 
3
“natural” and what is commonly called “artificial” is not a qualitative difference. 
Vogel acknowledges that human action can affect the “‘not-made-by-human’-ness” of 
objects (such as when one shapes flint into an arrow-head) but he denies that this 
transformation has an ontological depth.  That is, Vogel holds that rather than there 
4
being two separate categories (natural, artificial), the two are interwoven in such a 
way that there is​ ​no deep ontological divide​ ​such that an object might fall out of the 
set of natural things and into the set of artificial things, but rather every object is to 
some degree in both. 
To make this point, Vogel wants to highlight both the “artifactuality of nature” 
and the “nature of artifacts".  That is to say, not only is the world of nature 
5
permeated with the traits of artifacts, or ​builtness ​, but also that the world of 
human-constructed artifacts never fully escapes omnipresent naturalness. To the 
former point, Vogel argues “the world is perfectly real and material, just as real and 
material as our activities are... it is the product of our work, of what we ​do ​”.  Put 6
3
 Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 169. 
4
 Ibid​. 
5 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 168. 
6 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 167.  
3 
simply, the world including nature cannot be separated from human action since it is 
the product of human action.  
However, Vogel’s world-constituting constructivism does not exclude 
something​ besides human intention and activity contributing to the facticity of the 
environment, or more specifically the built environment. If the world-constituting 
material activities of human beings explain Vogel’s notion of the “artifactuality of 
nature”, it is the non-intentional aspect and potentiality for failure in technology that 
explain the “nature of artifacts”. Vogel writes: “Artifacts are ​things, ​they’re ​real​, they 
have properties that their designers never intended or expected them to have... ”  
7
Vogel then will not be satisfied with any nature/artifact distinction which rests solely 
on mental states. It is the reality of artifacts (i.e. the fact that they are material things 
in the world) that imbues them with naturalness since they will exhibit and be 
subject to forces that were not contained in the intention to build them.  
Even the intentional aspects of the artifacts humans construct are themselves 
not purely intentional. As Vogel writes, “the properties [the] designers never did 
intend came to be possessed by the artifact through the operation of forces the 
designers could never fully grasp".  In other words, the designer crafts the artifact 
8
from forces in the world which are independent of her intentional actions and 
(probably) not fully understood.  
The dichotomy of nature and artifact is overcome, or perhaps the dialectic 
reaches its synthesis, through the attribution of independence to artifacts and of 
builtness to the whole material world. In the case of the former, Vogel denies that 
independence is a defining feature of nature since it is also true that artifacts are 
7 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 168. 
8
 Ibid​. 
4 
independent. To this end, Vogel writes, “But the artifacts... remain physical through 
and through, and in that sense, they are ‘independent’ of humans".  In a sense then, 
9
the “nature of artifacts” is Vogel’s answer to Nature(1). 
 The “artificiality of nature” then should be Vogel’s answer to Nature(2). 
Nature(2), or the belief that nature is the totality of physical laws of the universe rests 
on an assumption that when one speaks of such laws one is appealing to a 
non-constructed sense of the natural. Yet if Vogel is correct, it is only through 
material ​human activity that the world is constructed; the world is built through 
humans and thus not independent of them. While Vogel cannot and does not deny 
that human intentions and beliefs are not omnipotent or infallible in what they 
attempt to bring into the world, he nevertheless believes that all humans encounter 
in the world is still constructed through human activity.  
The structure then of Vogel’s argument appears to be such: nature can be 
defined either as independent, or as the physical. The former attempt would seem to 
apply readily to the built environment, and the latter seems only to describe nature in 
so far as it is built by human activity. Thus no ontologically deep division can be 
drawn between what is constructed or artificial and what is natural, and the 
previously held categorical distinctions need to be discarded. 
Vogel holds that this realization is important for the good of human beings as 
it allows for a more intelligent account of proper action in contemporary society, and 
provides a challenge to the ideological function of other conceptions of nature. If 
Vogel is right to argue that nature is socially constructed, and this is generally not 
recognized, then Vogel has grounds for his charge that contemporary conceptions of 
9 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 142. 
5 
nature are ​alienating​ in a Marxist sense. Vogel explains that the view of nature as 
something ontologically separate from human beings makes it out to be “an 
externally given reality [people] cannot change but must simply accept” rather than a 
thing people had a role in constructing.   
10
It is on account of this allegedly feigned permanence and independence that 
Vogel raises his charge of ideology against the contemporary attempts to define and 
locate nature. If nature is held to be completely separate from humanity, then where 
humanity is, nature is not. Consequently, “the built environment is already fallen” 
and we need not work to preserve it, whereas “by protecting wilderness, we can 
excuse ourselves from responsibility for the environmental consequences of our own 
actions within the human, nonwild, world".  In other words, the alienation 
11
experienced by hypostatizing nature as human-free stuff blinds environmentalists 
and people more generally from recognizing the true concerns of the built 
environment they themselves inhabit.  
This is ideological in the sense that this view, though mistaken, expresses 
some deep truths about modern society.  That is to say, the alienation of the built 
12
environment as ​independent nature ​is in one sense the consequence of a false belief 
(the belief that nature is not constructed) but also expresses something true about 
the world people live in (i.e. nature is really treated as something outside of their 
control).  
Vogel then is making two separate cases. One is ontological. That is, Vogel 
holds that prior attempts to draw an ontological divide between nature and artifact 
10 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 89. 
11 ​Ibid, 7. 
12 ​Ibid, 67, 93. 
6 
have failed. He suggests alternatively the dichotomy be abandoned and the two 
categories be viewed as interwoven.  
Vogel’s second case is that prior attempts to define nature were not only 
wrong, but also ideological. They result from a sense of alienation and serve an 
ideological function. Consequently, to offer a contrary position to Vogel one will have 
to address both of these cases. One must provide an account of nature which does 
have ontological depth but also in some way answers Vogel’s charge of ideology. 
 I take such a contrary position. I believe Vogel’s argument is a result of the 
initial supposition that Nature(1) and Nature(2) adequately describe the plethora of 
alternatives offered to his position. Without this central dichotomy, his inference 
from a denial of the two definitions to the conclusion that there is no other 
satisfactory definition of nature is invalid. I propose that one may derive a distinct 
definition of nature from Aristotle’s account of ​φύσις​ in the ​Physics ​ which is not 
reducible to either Nature(1) or Nature(2). I believe that this third notion of nature 
Nature(3) can both avoid the problems Vogel raises in objection to Nature(1) and 
Nature(2) while also avoiding his charge of ideology.  
To develop more fully the idea of Nature(3) I will turn to the texts of Aristotle 
and St. Thomas Aquinas. I will also draw heavily on the continuing Thomistic 
tradition and defend the Aristotelian notion of ​φύσις ​in light of objections from 
modern science. I will end my discussion with an account of what some of the 
potential implications ​ ​of adopting Nature(3) would be for determining what actions 
are good in relation to the environment.  
7 
CHAPTER II: EXPLODING NATURE(1) AND NATURE(2) 
Before Vogel develops an account of what environmental philosophy can look 
like without a category of “natural”, he first highlights why past attempts to give an 
account of the essence of nature have failed. Vogel begins by highlighting a particular 
use of the term nature and its problems. This is Nature(1) or the concept of nature as 
something separate from humans, and hence, non-human in some important sense. 
Vogel then notes a second sense of nature, Nature(2), which encompasses all of 
material existence. This definition as well carries certain difficulties that make it 
unhelpful for discussions in environmental philosophy.  
Vogel first entertains the idea that the problems with Nature(1) and Nature(2) 
might be resolved by some alternative definition of nature. He finds after analysis 
that every alternative he mentions is reducible to or dependent upon either Nature(1) 
or Nature(2). This conclusion lends itself readily to his overall thesis that the concept 
of nature needs to be abandoned by environmental philosophy.  
I will not contest that Vogel’s objections are cogent refutations of Nature(1) 
and Nature(2) nor do I believe he is unfair to identify the various notions of nature 
he addresses as derivatives of them. Rather, I want to accept and catalogue the 
objections Vogel brings against Nature(1) and Nature(2). By doing this, I hope to 
provide a picture of what an alternative conception of nature must require.  
Section I: Vogel on Nature(1) and Nature(2) 
Vogel first examines a definition of nature which is taken from Bill 
McKibben’s ​The End of Nature ​: nature as something independent of humans. This 
view I shall refer to as Nature(1). McKibben believes that nature as such has been 
completely lost to human society since there remains no part of the world separate 
8 
from human society entirely.  That is to say, Nature(1) takes whatever is in some 
13
sense independent of humanity to be the natural, and this independence seems to be 
one of ​causal ​origins. Something then is natural in so far as it is ​not ​influenced by 
humans. 
Vogel, however, makes note that this definition is entirely negative and that 
the central thesis of ​The End of Nature ​can be phrased as a double negative: “ ​a world 
not produced by human action no longer exists”​.  ​Consequently, McKibben’s 14
definition of nature leaves no room for any kind of human activity which preserves 
nature. This creates two problems. 
The first problem with Nature(1) is the paralyzing effect it has for 
environmentalism of any sort. Vogel cites (approvingly) Callicot, who writes: “If we 
conceived of wilderness as a static benchmark of pristine nature in reference to 
which all human modifications may be judged to be more or less degradations,” then 
it is possible to avoid the difficult questions about how to live in the 
“four-dimensional, inherently dynamic landscapes” which humanity shares with 
other species.  Consequently even to speak of “what sort of human activity might be 
15
best for a landscape” Vogel writes, “is irrelevant or even meaningless".  Therefore, 
16
Nature(1) excludes there ever being any coherent environmentally conservative 
action. Thus, it would seem Nature(1) is not useful for environmental philosophy 
because it lacks any indication of what one ought to do about the environment. 
The second problem with Nature(1) is the entailed requirement that nature be 
chronologically prior to human contact. If nature is necessarily independent of 
13
 Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 2. 
14
 Ibid, ​10. 
15
 Qtd in Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 6. 
16
 ​Ibid, ​6. 
9 
human activity then not only environmental conservation efforts, but also 
restorative ​efforts are incoherent. If humans plant trees, their actions are no less 
human than if they were to cut them down. Thus, Katz argues that environmental 
restorations are impossible: “For once humans have transformed an area its 
naturalness is gone forever".  In other words, the natural is prior to contact with the 
17
human chronologically, and that from the time of contact forward the naturalness is 
forever lost. 
Yet if this is the case, then it must be that all areas of the world are in one of 
two categories: untouched nature, or transformed non-nature. Granting for the sake 
of argument that there was at least at some point some things in the former category, 
it also clear on their account that much has been moved to the second. However, as 
shown by Socrates in the ​Phaedo​, movements between poles cannot be a 
unidirectional infinite when the things being moved are themselves finite. That is to 
say, if what is natural can become non-natural but the non-natural can never return 
to nature, then given a finite amount of nature, it will only be a finite amount of time 
before there is ​no ​nature. Eventually non-nature will ​consume ​the whole of nature. 
Thus Nature(1), if it ​ever ​existed, would have to exist within a temporal range, 
and it is not clear that the twenty-first century (or any part of it) falls within that 
range. In fact, there are good reasons to think that we do not inhabit such a range. 
Following McKibben, Vogel claims “nature itself had literally been destroyed” for, in 
the time after the large-scale burning of fossil fuels and destruction of the ozone 
layer, “not one square inch of Earth” can still be considered unaffected by human 
activity.  In consequence then, Nature(1) appears not only to be unable to offer any 
18
17
 ​Ibid, ​3. 
18
 Ibid, ​2. 
10 
guidance on what actions one should take, but also appears to be an empty category. 
Nature(1) would then be to environmental philosophy both useless and vacuous. 
However beyond these problems, Nature(1) seems to rest on a contradiction. 
Vogel notes that McKibben’s view seems to entail that human beings themselves are 
not natural since they have a unique ability to bring things out of nature.  It appears 
19
to rely on a ​dualism ​between the human and the natural. Yet this does not appear to 
be the case. At least since Darwin it has been commonly held that the human species 
belongs with the others as a natural part of the biosphere.  If human beings are 
20
natural, our contact with “nature” should not endanger it any more than the contact 
of other species does. Human buildings should be no more unnatural than a beaver’s 
constructing a dam, yet “the dam will never be described as unnatural".   
21
However, this apparent contradiction can be resolved once one recognizes the 
equivocation at work. Appealing to John Stuart Mill, Vogel draws out the necessary 
distinction between two uses of the word “nature” in order to allow McKibben’s 
thesis to remain intelligible if still not entirely persuasive. The two definitions of 
nature are the result of contrasting the term “natural” with one of two antonyms. The 
“natural” can be set up in contrast to the “artificial” (i.e. that which has been crafted 
by people) as McKibben uses the term (i.e. Nature(1)), or it can mean “natural” in 
contrast to the “supernatural” such that the totality of naturally occurring processes 
in the universe is “Nature” (herein referred to as Nature(2)).  Human beings and 
22
their actions are definitely still natural in the second sense, but whereas humans 
19 ​Ibid, ​11. 
20
 Ibid​. 
21
 ​Ibid, ​23. 
22
 Ibid, ​12. 
11 
generally are not described as “artificial”, they may act in a way productive of 
artifacts. 
The question for Vogel still remains, can either of these definitions of nature 
provide a meaningful category of “nature” that can be protected? Vogel believes the 
answer is a resounding “No”. A definition is only a good definition insofar as it picks 
out that to which it is meant to refer to the exclusion of what it does not refer. This 
entails that definition must avoid both deficiency and excess. Nevertheless, if 
Nature(1) misses the proper mean by being exclusive of too much (to the point of not 
describing anything), Nature(2) commits the opposite error: it captures too much.  
In the case of Nature(2), nothing in the physical world, including pieces of 
technology, escape being classified as natural. Consequently, nothing one does to the 
natural environment can make it “unnatural” and conservation efforts are thus 
“pointless”.  Notwithstanding the possibility of divine intervention such that 
23
something natural might become supernatural, no human action has this power. 
Anything human beings build will not be a transmutation of earthly elements 
into heavenly ones, but will in fact be the constructing of things within Nature(2). 
The engines in human-built cars and planes observe the same physical laws 
pertaining to combustion that wildfires do. Even more to the point, human-caused 
carbon emissions turn out just as natural as photosynthesis.  That is to say since the 
24
greenhouse effect is as much a product of the laws of physics as the various 
operations involved in photosynthesis, then, Nature(2) does not provide criteria for 
distinguishing the two events, nor valuing one over the other.  
Section II: Alleged Alternative Definitions 
23
 ​Ibid​, 13. 
24
 ​Ibid​. 
12 
Since both of these definitions of nature are inadequate and unhelpful, Vogel 
concludes there is no reason to maintain any concept of nature. However, it would 
seem other definitions of nature are at least possible, and that one such definition 
may be more useful than either of the two given. Ultimately, I hold that this is the 
case, but Vogel does not seem to agree. Thus, when Vogel does bring up other 
conceptions of nature, they are always ​de facto ​ reducible to the two already 
described. 
For example, Vogel notes that the claim “nature is life” is ​prima facie ​distinct 
from both Nature(1) and Nature(2).  However, this definition becomes problematic 
25
when one attempts to distinguish between the biological and non-biological 
functions of living beings.  If human beings emit CO​
2 ​both by breathing and driving 
26
cars, there would seem no reason to call one biological and the other artificial.  If 
27
one objects that the car, unlike one’s lungs, is a non-natural product of human beings 
then one simply begs the question. Humans do produce cars, but they also produce 
other human beings. Yet it is only the latter productive actions which are called 
“biological” even though it is only as a result of the dexterity and intelligence the 
human species is ​biologically ​endowed with that cars can be produced.  It seems 28
then that just as emissions from human offspring are not ​unnatural ​simply because 
every human being is the product of a long history of sexual reproduction, neither are 
the emissions of engines produced by a long history of industrial reproduction 
unnatural.  
25
 ​Ibid, ​16. 
26
 Ibid, ​17. 
27
 ​Ibid​. 
28
 ​Ibid​. 
13 
To attempt to define nature as life seems to collapse then into Nature(2). If life 
is the key feature of nature, then all actions of living things are also natural. Yet this 
encompasses everything human beings produce and anything that might be thought 
to “threaten” nature. An atomic bomb and a tree turn out both to be natural; the 
former, only as the product of a living being, but the latter as a product of its 
ancestors reproduction. Thus on the same grounds that Nature(2) is rejected, so 
must the definition of nature as life be abandoned.  
Additionally, Vogel momentarily addresses the claim that nature is ​the 
normative. He writes: “I think the answer has to do with yet one more meaning that 
the word ‘nature’ frequently has,... Mill mentions... nature as a ​normative standard​".
 Vogel’s word choice is interesting. By using the phrase “yet one more” it would 
29
seem Vogel is suggesting that nature considered as the normative was distinct from 
both Nature(1) and Nature(2).  Nevertheless, Vogel seems to still have Nature(2) in 
30
mind.  
Vogel uses Mill to illustrate this point. Mill writes: “In sober truth, nearly all 
the things for which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are 
nature’s everyday performance..." and he goes on to catalogue the various ways in 
which “Nature” kills or otherwise harms people.  Vogel concludes that “trying to act 
31
more ‘naturally’ in this sense scarcely seems like a good idea".   
32
Surely, it is very difficult to deny Vogel’s conclusion here if one granted that 
this is really the sense of nature at issue. But this does not seem to be the case. 
29
 ​Ibid, ​26. 
30
 In fact, it is, as I will argue, an account of a nature that is significantly different from the previously 
mentioned definitions that one can derive and articulate a normative account. 
31
 Qtd. in Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 26-27. 
32
 ​Ibid, ​27. 
14 
Whereas initially, Vogel sets up the claim “nature is the normative standard” to be 
something separable from the earlier definitions, Vogel drops the distinction. Rather, 
Vogel treats the claim “nature is the normative standard” to mean “the physical laws 
of the universe are the normative standard”. This is illustrated by the ideas Vogel 
takes from Mill. Firstly, Nature (capital N) is imparted some form of agency such that 
one can speak of the “everyday performance” of nature as something which includes 
“all the things for which men are hanged”, that is the types of things which are 
morally censurable, especially in terms of serious punishment.   
33
Since the idea of holding Nature accountable to any standard as if it were an 
agent would seem itself absurd, then, as charity dictates, one should read Mill as 
using a poetic device to illustrate his point. Nevertheless, the problem still does not 
clear up. It would not seem that the obvious sense of the claim “nature is the 
normative standard” is equivalent to “the actions that an imagined agent ‘Nature’ 
would perform are the normative standard". Ultimately, however, this confusion 
seems to rest not in the image itself but in the concept of nature Mill is presupposing. 
The fact that Mill assumes Nature(2) (ie. the totality of physical laws) is 
evident from the examples he gives of the actions of the figurative agent Nature. In 
his catalogue of natural calamities, Mill enumerates “wild beasts”, crushing with 
stones, freezing by cold, poison, and hurricanes.  Yet all of these things can only be 
34
linked under the wider conception of nature. As one is sure Mill would agree, there 
are no fairies or some other particular agent who makes cold to freeze or poison to 
kill, but rather it is the regularity of nature described by the laws of physics, 
chemistry, biology etc. that capture these phenomena. Thus when Vogel, using Mill’s 
33
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distinctions, attempts to offer a refutation of the claim “nature is the normative 
standard” ultimately Vogel is restating his opposition to nature conceived as the 
totality of physical laws.  
Another attempted definition of nature Vogel puts forth is “Nature as 
Alienation”.  Vogel takes a Marxist view (or in his own terms a ​Hegelian Marxist 35
view) of alienation derived from the ​1844 Manuscripts​.  Karl Marx described 36
alienation in terms of a worker who produces commodities which are then 
encountered as “​something alien ​, as a​ power independent ​of the producer”; further, 
Marx claims that alienation imparts to commodities the illusion of self-existence: 
“The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes 
an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as 
something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him".  
37
Vogel frames this idea by highlighting its Hegelian parallels. In the Lord-Bondsman 
relation, the initial and insatiable “desire” of the subject to consume the objects it 
encounters is negated, not in such a way that negates the object entirely (thus 
perpetuating the cycle) but in such a way that “the object’s independence from the 
subject is both cancelled and preserved".  That is to say, while initially the subject 
38
also destroys objects through consumption, the Bondsman ends this by taking on the 
role of transforming the objects through work and giving them permanent existence.
 As Vogel summarizes “the bondsman both changes the world and changes 
39
himself... [he] makes himself into something real in the world".  
40
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Nevertheless, what is produced is ​still ​consumed; the products of the 
bondman’s labour are consumed by the lord, just as the products of Marx’s 
proletariat are consumed by the bourgeois.  In both cases, the objects imparted 
41
existence by the bondsman or proletariat are constructed from the very life of the 
worker, but in both cases that life is taken from the worker for the sake of another.  
42
Consequently, Marx argues, the more labour produces, the more power the bourgeois 
has over the labourer.  Therefore, Vogel notes it is through alienation that the 
43
various things people produce acquire a “sham self-sufficiency in which they 
paradoxically become the masters of those who produce them".  In other words, 
44
alienation promotes a false power dynamic where the things one produces and ought 
to have power over, are taken as instruments of bondage themselves. 
After devoting much time to formulating the above points, Vogel asks his 
readers “What are the implications of this analysis of Marx’s notion of alienation for 
the question of alienation from nature?”  To which his first answer is that there is no 
45
obvious application.  At least this would be the case, if each definition were to be 
46
taken on its own terms. Vogel then notes that while definitionally both senses of 
nature rule out alienation from nature, it is on account of Nature(1) that we are 
“alienated from our ​environment​” in fact.  That is to say, because of the concept of 47
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42
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nature as wilderness, humans do not recognize the built-ness of their environments. 
Vogel explains  
The identification of the ‘environment’ with ‘nature’ that is so characteristic of 
much contemporary environmentalism is itself a symptom of alienation... For 
the world that actually environs us, the real ‘environment’ that we inhabit, as I 
have been arguing, is ​not ​‘nature’ at all - [i.e. it is not nature in the sense of 
wilderness] - but is rather a world that is indeed always already built.  
48
Nature, then, is a part of the built environment given “sham self-sufficiency” through 
alienating it as Nature(1). 
In effect then, Vogel’s claim “nature is alienation” is tied closely to the 
conception of nature as ​untouched​ wilderness. Vogel’s claim then perhaps could be 
better expressed in other words as “if someone holds that nature is wilderness and 
that there is still nature, then she has been alienated from the built environment in 
which she lives". In this way, the very conceptualization of nature in society serves 
what amounts to an ideological purpose. This latter point I will address in my next 
chapter. Sufficient for my current purposes is this claim: The definition of nature as 
the alienated built environment is a restatement of, not an alternative to Nature(1). 
Another attempt to define nature is the view that nature is the noumenal in a 
Kantian sense. That is, analogous to Immanuel Kant’s concept of noumenal world of 
things-in-themselves “counter-posed” to the phenomenal world shaped by the 
human knower’s concepts, nature is said to be the underlying substratum of the built 
48
 Ibid, ​89. 
18 
environment.  However, this would result in nature being something one can never 
49
“know” or “experience”.   
50
There is a clear parallel in this definition of nature with Nature(1). For if the 
“nature as noumena” and “built environment as phenomena” analogy were to hold, 
then all that anyone ever encountered would already be the built environment. Since 
the act of knowing is taken to remove something from the natural—noumenal—realm 
into the built—phenomenal—environment, all the world as one knows it is unnatural.
 That is to say, just as human activity has impacted the whole planet such that to 
51
speak of an untouched nature is meaningless, to speak of a noumenal nature is not to 
speak of anything one knows about or experiences. This definition of nature then 
proves useless for environmental philosophy, since all the crises dealt with by 
environmental philosophy are always in the phenomenal not the noumenal realm.  
52
Nature as the noumenal does not allow one to act towards nature in any way 
whatsoever, either to preserve or to destroy, and once again proves to be a useless 
category for environmental philosophy. 
Vogel also notes the possible definition of nature as “difference” as the 
recognition that “our every attempt” to change the world is “infected by failure".  In 
53
other words, nature is what resists the projects humans try to act out in the world. 
However, much like Nature(1), this is not a definition of nature at all; it is an 
apophatic exercise. Nothing is said about nature itself when nature is defined as 
difference. If nature is only described as the resistance to human projects, then all 
49
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that has been said is beyond or behind those projects. If nature becomes the 
substratum on which human activity acts, then nothing one encounters is going to be 
nature, since the very act of conceptualizing ​x ​has made it a product of human 
activity and not part of the substratum.  
This is the key insight that Vogel takes from Kant: the knower has an active 
role in constructing the object of knowledge.  Just as in the failure to identify nature 
54
with the noumenal, the failure to define nature as difference is a result of the 
inalienable activity involved in engaging with the world. Thus Vogel asks, just as 
Hegel does of Kant’s thing-in-itself, what is the point of a conception of nature either 
as the noumenal or difference if both amount to something one cannot possibly 
discuss or say anything about?  Therefore, the attempt to define nature as ​difference 55
results in the same problems as other attempts to define nature as untouched 
(Nature(1)), and is rejected on the same principles.  
Section III: The Problem Formulated 
As I parse Vogel’s account, two things are central to his argument. Firstly, any 
attempt to define nature as the untouched, or worse the inaccessible, is neither 
tenable nor is it useful. It is untenable because such a definition will result either in 
an empty category (such as environments not impacted by human action) or an 
unknowable category (something entirely separate from the world of one’s 
experiences). Any such attempt will also be useless as it will not allow for any 
coherent account of what human actions are to be taken for the benefit of nature; 
thus, it will be more paralyzing than informative. For these reasons, we must 
abandon Nature(1) 
54
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Secondly, any attempt to define nature as the totality of the physical will be 
useless. If everything that is physical is natural, then a parking lot is just as natural as 
a forest or swamp. Since nature is impervious to human activity, no definition falling 
under Nature(2) is going to be of use to an environmental philosophy which seeks to 
preserve something called nature.  
Consequently, one is faced with a particular disjunction: Either there is no 
tenable and useful definition of nature for environmental philosophy, or there is 
some definition of nature which does not fall under Nature(1) or Nature(2). I believe 
Vogel shows that many possible candidates for the third definition of nature are in 
fact just reiterations of the problematic definitions of nature found in Nature(1) and 
Nature(2). I believe, however, that a third definition is possible and can be found in 
the philosophical tradition of Aristotelian-Thomism. I will articulate and defend this 
view in a later chapter, while being careful to avoid the Scylla​ ​of Nature(1) and the 
Charybdis​ ​of Nature(2).   
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CHAPTER III: NATURE AND IDEOLOGY 
One may be tempted to ask why Vogel takes the misconceptions about nature 
to be so problematic, and not mere banalities. The reason is that Vogel takes it to be 
an “alienated and ideological error” when one “fails to see” the natural as built or the 
built as natural.  That is to say, the alienation of nature, which Vogel criticizes, is an 
56
“ideological” failure to find the truth. I have already addressed how the concept of 
nature as the alienated environment is one iteration of Nature(1), but it will be 
helpful here to be less terse and address Vogel’s account of alienation in full.  To do 
57
this, I will first explain what Vogel means when he refers to the builtness of the 
environment. Additionally, it will be helpful to further explain what ideology, in 
general, is in Vogel’s account in order to understand what it is about the views Vogel 
takes to be ideological. Lastly, I wish to formulate some sketch of what it would mean 
for a concept of nature not to be censored as ideological.  
Section I: Vogel, Nature(1), and Ideology  
Vogel’s notion of ideology can be gathered from his use of the term in 
Thinking Like a Mall​. From the relevant passages it can be seen that not all errors 
are ideological. Rather, there is something much more insidious about ideology, in 
that it affirms the status quo in a harmful way. Thus, Vogel takes care in addition to 
showing that Nature(1) is an untenable position, that it in fact is ​harmful ​ in a 
particular way to human beings. 
Vogel distances himself from those who would use the term ideology as a 
generic and neutral term. He makes clear ideology is not what constitutes the world 
56 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 97. 
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we inhabit.  That is, it’s not a description for whatever framework one might use to 
58
understand the world. Vogel wants to make clear that our world is a product of our 
“work” in contrast to various non-work elements he lists, including as separate items 
“our worldview” and “our ideology".  Thus ideology must be distinguished both from 
59
our actions and our worldview, or at the very least there must be something about 
one’s actions or worldview that makes them ideological beyond their mere being 
actions or worldviews. This distinction, though ultimately trivial, rules out the 
identification of all worldviews as ideology, and is indicative that the term carries 
some normative connotations, since presumably (all things being equal) a 
non-ideological worldview is one that ought to be preferred to an ideological view. 
At other points in his work, Vogel is clearer about what he means by ideology. 
Explicitly citing the Marxist tradition, Vogel defines ideology as: “a mistaken view 
that nonetheless expresses a truth about the contemporary world, one that reveals 
what’s wrong with that world..."  Further, after again posing the question as to why 
60
defining nature as separate is important to us Vogel specifies the sense in which the 
project is ideological, that is, “it expresses a mistaken view of the world that at the 
same time reveals something deep about our world, the particular social order that 
we inhabit".  In both cases, Vogel places emphasis on a few crucial elements of 
61
ideology.  
Firstly, the primary feature of ideological views are that they are mistaken. It 
may be conceivable that someone else defines ideology broadly enough to encompass 
both mistaken and true views, but it is clear that Vogel believes mistakeness is an 
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essential feature of ideology. Consequently, Vogel’s charge of ideology is reliant upon 
and no stronger than his charge that advocates of a natural and built distinction are 
wrong.  
Secondly, beyond merely being wrong, certain criteria need to apply to a view 
in question that make it ideological. Vogel gives three criteria, as shown above. The 
first is that ideological views, despite being mistaken, reveal something true about 
the contemporary world.  In other words, to be ideology, a view must relate to the 
62
status quo​ of the current state of affairs. Views contrary to this ​status quo​, whether 
or not they are otherwise problematic, are not ideology. Second, such a view must 
express something significant and consequential about the social order, or as Vogel 
says it must express something “deep” about the ​status quo ​.  Therefore, superficial 63
mistakes are not ideological. Third, ideological views are not only mistaken, but 
“wrong” ​for ​people (​viz​. contrary to their good or true interests).  Therefore, if a 64
view is to be charged with being ideological, it must be also found to be harmful.  
 As Vogel notes, ideology props up the contemporary state of affairs, so 
definitionally, any nature versus built distinction which challenges this will be 
necessarily non-ideological. However, to establish this one must first articulate what 
aspects of the ​status quo ​Vogel believes are being supported by the notion of nature 
as separate. Fortunately, Vogel notes his concerns specifically. He writes: “by 
protecting wilderness, we excuse ourselves from responsibility for the environmental 
consequences of our own actions within the human, nonwild, world".  This is 
65
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because “human beings are by definition left out of wilderness".  Put in other words, 
66
Vogel’s concern is that a sharp nature versus built divide removes the places human 
beings live from being considered by conservation efforts. By romanticizing the 
“untouched” wilderness, it is valued beyond the places people actually live. Callicot 
explains “If we conceived of wilderness as a static benchmark of pristine nature in 
reference to which all human modifications may be judged to be more or less 
degradations,” then it is possible to avoid the difficult questions about how to live in 
the “four-dimensional, inherently dynamic landscapes” which humanity shares with 
other species.  Conservationism which privileges “pristine nature” is then an 
67
obstacle to dealing with the complex issues involved in the built environment of 
modern life because it denies that any project to salvage a relationship between 
humanity and its environment is logically possible. Consequently even to speak of 
“what sort of human activity might be best for a landscape” Vogel writes, “is 
irrelevant or even meaningless".  
68
Furthermore, beyond the merely preventive ideological implications of the 
view, Vogel believes the standard distinction between the natural and the built 
positively contributes to the problems of contemporary society. Vogel depends on the 
Indian historian Ramaehandra Guha to make this point. Guha records how 
conservation projects, supported both by former elites in India and international 
NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund, negatively impact the rural populations of the 
would-be park lands; he writes: “ The designation of tiger reserves was made possible 
66
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only by the physical displacement of existing villages and their inhabitants".  Guha 
69
further explains that it is the “Deep Ecology” which divorces environmentalism from 
“human interests” completely which provides the justification of such “inequitable 
conservation practices” which he states earlier has led to the “direct transfer of 
resources from the poor to the rich".  
70
In order to show that a nature versus non-nature distinction can be made in 
an unproblematic way, one will first have to understand in what way the “ideological” 
notion of nature as separate is taken to be “wrong” beyond simply being mistaken 
(i.e. the above mentioned harmfulness of the notion of Nature(1)). And in turn, one 
will have given an alternative conception of nature which avoids such harmfulness, 
that is, a conception of nature which includes real concern for human interests, 
especially humans who live in manifestly built environments. 
Section II: Application 
Vogel’s charge of ​ideology ​must be met by specifically addressing the criteria 
he gives for what makes a view ideological. Thus, if one wishes to keep in mind 
Vogel’s objections on ideological grounds, there are a few ways one can establish 
some kind of nature versus built distinction while escaping his charge. Firstly, and 
perhaps most simply, one may establish that the grounds for making some kind of 
distinction are more cogent than Vogel’s for rejecting them. As stated, Vogel’s own 
criteria for ideology excludes the charge being levied against true views.  
While this may be the simplest manner ​per se​, this solution will also depend 
on the arguments used in support of this distinction, and ultimately the disposition 
69
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and background of the audience. For the latter as much as the former are relevant to 
the overall cogency of the case for the distinction. Thus the simplest solution ​per se 
may also be the most difficult ​de facto ​to establish, in which case it would be better to 
exclude Vogel’s charges on some additional grounds.  
There are three possible ways of achieving this. Firstly, the distinction 
between the natural and the built could be made in such a way that it is contrary to 
the ​status quo​, superficial, or not problematic (in the sense of being contrary to one’s 
true interests). If a view accused of being ideological does not support the ​status quo 
or even challenges it, then, at least on Vogel’s terms, it is not ideology. Alternatively, 
if a view only touches on that which is superficial or of little consequence then it does 
not meet Vogel’s criteria of revealing something “deep” about society. However, due 
to the gravity of the nature versus built distinction, it is unlikely that any formulation 
of this distinction could be superficial. Lastly, one may also argue that a distinction 
between nature and the built environment may be made that is not contrary to our 
own interests. It is then in respect to this first and third manner that one may be able 
to meet Vogel’s charges. 
It remains to be determined whether a view can be established which is 
contrary to the ​status quo ​and in line with humanity’s true interests. I will argue that 
an Aristotelian account meets both these criteria. Firstly, that an Aristotelian account 
is not in conformity with the contemporary ​status quo ​would follow naturally enough 
from the difference between it and the concept of Nature(1) which Vogel takes to be 
the operating assumption of contemporary environmental policy. More 
fundamentally, however, I wish to show that an Aristotelian evaluation of what is 
good in nature would lead to a substantial change in policy if it were to be taken up. 
27 
Lastly, an Aristotelian evaluation, by not excluding human nature from the 
discussion of nature would, in so far as it values the goods of other natures, also value 
humanity’s own interest. To this end, then, is left an articulation of that very 
Aristotelian position, to which I now turn.  
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CHAPTER IV: ARISTOTLE ON NATURE 
In contradistinction to Vogel’s two definitions of nature, I posit that a third 
can be found in the writings of Aristotle, and the tradition (particularly the Thomistic 
tradition) which followed him. This third definition of nature I believe is more robust 
than either of the definitions addressed by Vogel in so far as it is not susceptible to 
the criticisms he raises. As Vogel’s stated purpose is to challenge an ​ontological ​view 
I hold that Aristotelian philosophy is perfectly suited to redress his arguments. To 
illustrate this, it will be first necessary to explain what ​nature ​is for Aristotelianism. 
To this end, I will draw both from Aristotle’s own work and those later authors who 
follow from him.   
71
Section I: Nature as an Internal Principle and the Notion of Substance 
The relevant word used by Aristotle to describe nature is ​φ​ύσις​, which St. 
Thomas Aquinas treats as functionally equivalent to the Latin ​natura​, the ancestor of 
modern English’s word ​nature​. Articulating a description of nature is the project of 
Aristotle’s ​Physics ​but most especially ​Physics ​II. After addressing some Pre-Socratic 
concerns about the very notion of natural philosophy and investigating the principles 
of aforementioned natural philosophy, Aristotle moves on to articulate what ​φ​ύσις ​is 
in respect to the objects of natural philosophy.  
71
 My primary goal in all of this is to present a single unified view based on ​Aristotelian ​principles, 
rather than give any thorough interpretation of Aristotle’s work itself. Thus, if the account of an 
Aristotelian concept of nature goes beyond what the texts of Aristotle in isolation would indicate, I do 
not see this as antithetical to my goal. Aristotelianism is a living philosophical tradition that at once 
contains traditional notions and modern innovations. It is much beyond the scope of this project 
either to give a full account of the development of every Aristotelian idea from Aristotle to their 
Thomistic or Neo-Aristotelian counter-parts, or to catalogue the historic and contemporary diversity 
among Aristotelians (especially if one includes Thomists or other schools of Scholastic thought). While 
I do not wish to imply there is more unity between these schools than there actually is, or that I am 
giving an account which would be ​the ​single Aristotelian account, I wish to present an account which 
is nonetheless ​distinctively ​Aristotelian, or at least Aristotelian-Thomist. 
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Aristotle begins his discussion of what nature is by defining its relationship to 
natural objects​. As Aristotle writes: “Natural objects include animals and their parts, 
plants and simple bodies... the obvious difference between all these things and things 
which are not natural is that each of the natural ones contains within itself a source 
of change and stability, in respect to either movement or increase and decrease or 
alteration".  Put simply, in a natural object its “source of change and stability” is 
72
internal. For this reason, Aristotle claims the natural object is always a ​substance 
because “to have a principle” involves being the ​subject ​of that principle.  That is to 73
say, the natural object is never the accident of a subject, but always the subject itself. 
Thus natural objects are substances with internal principles of motion and stability. 
Consequently, it is necessary that both (i) the term substance and (ii) the phrase 
internal principles of motion and stability be understood. 
Subsection (i) The Notion of Substance 
It should be recalled that ​substance ​is the first of Aristotle’s ​Categories​. 
Primarily, the term substance is used to refer to individuals of a kind (e.g. an 
individual koala or cedar tree).  That is, a substance is a ​thing ​as opposed to an 74
accident of a thing. The koala itself, and not its predicates like greyness, is the 
substance. The primary sense of substance would seem to describe ​subjects ​,​ ​that is, 
the individuals of which one can predicate things but cannot themselves be 
predicated of anything.  
72
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There are two senses of substance, however. While the individual koala is a 
substance in this primary sense, there is a secondary sense of substance which is the 
koala-ness of that individual koala. Aristotle notes of this secondary sense of 
substance that it is “predicable of a substance, but is not present in a subject”.  As 
75
Aristotle goes on to explain “present in a subject” means to be “incapable of existence 
apart from said subject”.  Hence, when Aristotle gives the example of the secondary 
76
substance “man” he notes that one can predicate of a particular man that he is a man, 
but “man” does not exist in that man the same way the “whiteness” (or any other 
colour) of his body does.   
77
 In other words, substance in the secondary sense is not present in the subject 
but it is not the subject itself. Secondary substance must, then, be something which 
describes what the primary substance is. For example, to say “Esther was a human” is 
not to predicate to her some accident which has its existence in Esther, but rather it 
is to predicate of Esther some universal by which she can be understood. A secondary 
substance, then, is that kind of which a primary substance is a particular.  
It is in the same way that the primary and secondary senses of substance are 
distinguished that the term ​nature ​is distinguished from the natural object. As shown 
from the above-cited passages from the ​Physics ​, Aristotle holds nature ​belongs ​to 
natural objects which are primary substances. That is, nature is something other than 
the natural object itself. 
 Aristotle makes a similar point in the ​Metaphysics ​. When discussing various 
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uses of the term “nature” in ​Metaphysics ​V the two last definitions noted are the 
“essence of natural objects” and “every essence in general”.  That is to say, the 
78
nature of a thing is its essence. St. Thomas Aquinas also identifies the “essence” of a 
thing with the “​quidditas​” or what-ness of a thing.  He equates the quidditas  with 79 80
the Aristotelian notion of ​quod quid erat esse​, or ​τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι , or “that through which 
something is a certain kind of being”.  That is, to say “the nature is the essence of a 
81
particular thing” is to say that a thing’s nature is that through which a thing comes to 
be kind of the thing it is. It is by its nature or essence that a particular panda is an 
example of the kind of things which are pandas.  
 It is in this sense that St. Thomas means: “It [​quidditas​] is called ​form​, 
moreover, inasmuch as ‘form’ signified the certitude of anything".  This is not, 
82
however, simply the form taken in isolation. As St. Thomas further explains “it is 
necessary that an essence... be neither the form alone nor the matter alone but both".
 For this reason, St. Thomas notes that “everything is what it is by its form” but also 
83
“the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether 
material or efficient”.  Thus one cannot speak of the ​quidditas ​of a thing which is 84
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itself composed of both form and matter without referring to both as parts of the 
quidditas​. St. Thomas notes the difference in sense when one speaks of the form in 
the sense of essence, and the form in the sense of the substantial form. For when one 
speaks of the form “humanity” one is speaking of the essence of being human, and 
therefore must be speaking of both the material and formal components requisite of 
being human; the term “soul” (​soul ​just being the word for formal cause of any living 
being) refers only to the form which “makes actual” some parcel of matter as the part 
of a human being.   
85
Despite this ambiguity of the term, St. Thomas also notes in the above-quoted 
passage of the ​Summa Theologica​ that “the form itself is signified by the species; for 
everything is placed in its species by its form".  It would seem that this refers to a 
86
wider sense of form since St. Thomas notes that the definition of species entails both 
the form and matter.  That is, ​essence ​is what determines whether something is of a 87
particular species.  
88
 What is meant by the term “species” here is illuminated by the secondary 
sense of substance as seen in the ​Categories.​ Aristotle writes: “[I]n a secondary sense 
those things are called substances within which as species, the primary substances 
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are included".  Aristotle goes on to give the examples of the species “man” and the 
89
genus “animal”, as including the primary substance (viz. individual) “a man”.  
90
Species then refers to ​universals ​under which particular substances fall. That is to 
say, the ​kind ​of thing which something is is a consequence of its form. Essence then 
also carries with it the notion of a natural kind.  
If essence refers to natural kinds, so then ought the word “nature” since St. 
Thomas treats the terms as functionally equivalent. Consequently, as St. Thomas 
notes, the term “nature” signifies essence when it is taken to mean what “can be 
grasped intellectually in some way”.  That is to say, St. Thomas holds the essence to 
91
be what the mind grasps when it attempts to make individuals intelligible. To give a 
full account of the epistemological implications of this idea remains for another 
chapter, but it is important to note now that this means the nature of a thing is 
captured by its definition.  As St. Thomas notes: “For a thing is only intelligible 
92
through its definition and essence". Thus, it would appear that it is the ​kind ​or 
universal under which a natural object falls that is said to be its nature. So “nature” 
refers to “substance” in the secondary sense, but a “natural object” like a koala, a 
lump of jade, a blue whale, etc. are respectively each an individual primary 
substance.  
As St. Thomas notes, the term essence is closely tied to the notion of 
definition. Unlike Locke’s idea of substance as “I know not what”, the Aristotelian 
notion of essence entails the conceptual possibility of definition. This does not entail, 
nor even imply, that the true definition of a substance is easy to gather, and in so far 
89
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as Aristotelians may have lost sight of the need for rigorous investigations, they 
perhaps deserve Francis Bacon’s criticisms. Nevertheless, since these rightly 
criticized hasty generalizations are at best corruptions of Aristotelianism rather than, 
or at worst non-essential methodical errors sometimes associated with 
Aristotelianism, there is no need to dwell on such criticisms.  
The notion of definition at interest here is defined by Aristotle in the ​Topics​: 
“A ‘definition’ is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence".  In the previous section, 
93
Aristotle raises as an example a definition of humans as the “animal that walks on 
two feet” which (though ultimately a false definition) gives an example of what 
Aristotle means when he says that definitions are concerned with “sameness and 
difference".  ​The sameness in the aforementioned definition is “animal” as humans 94
are animals like other things, but the difference is alleged to be bipedalism.  So a 
95
definition then is an articulation of the essence of a thing based on what similarities 
its kind has with other kinds (a genus) and the distinguishing feature of its kind from 
those other kinds.  
So far it is evident that the “nature” of “natural objects” referred to in ​Physics 
II is, in fact, the secondary substance, or ​natural kind​, under which the primary 
substance, i.e. the natural object itself, belongs, and that nature then refers to the 
form ​of the natural object when ​form ​is understood as the whole ​essence ​including 
both the formal and material causes. Importantly, even though it does not belong to 
the species human to have the particular matter of Paul, it does belong to humanity 
93
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that every human being have both a body (matter) and a soul  (form).  
96
Subsection (ii) The Notion of Internal Principles  
It might sensibly be asked in what sense the principles of change and rest are 
“internal” in any given object. As stated above, the nature​ ​of a given natural object is 
not the primary substance, but the secondary substance or natural kind which only 
exists by virtue of the individuals which exist under its particular form. Thus when 
Aristotle claims “nature always implies a subject in which it inheres” he should not be 
taken as referring to the nature as the ​accidents ​of a substance but rather is excluding 
primary substances as being nature.   
97
That nature is not to be taken as the accidents existing is proved by Aristotle’s 
subsequent remarks on the motion of fire. Aristotle explicitly says “the property 
[which is an accident] of fire to be carried upwards” is not a “nature” but rather is an 
example of the subject acting “by its nature”.  The relation of the natural properties 
98
of an object to its nature is important but will be addressed later. What must be 
excluded, however, is the identification of nature with properties or any set thereof. 
Nature then is ​predicable ​of natural objects. It can be described as that 
aforementioned sense of substance which is “predicable of a [primary] substance, but 
is not present in a subject”.  Consequently, to say a natural object contains its nature 
99
as an internal principle is not to say that it has some part which is its nature, nor that 
96
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some bundle of traits constitute its nature, but rather that the fundamental 
predication of it as a kind is what is at issue when speaking of its nature. 
In so far then as a property is a “predicate which does not indicate the essence 
of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone” one sees that the properties are, while 
truly distinct from the essence, the proper manifestations of an essence.  That fire 
100
left to its nature will move upwards is ​natural ​to it, and in so far as what is natural is 
of value ( a contention for later), that upwards movement is that more valuable than 
its interruption. It remains, however, to be shown why being natural ​per se ​entails 
any kind of normative significance.  
Section II: Movement in Accordance with Nature 
Since properties flow from the essence of a natural object rather than from any 
other accident, it should be noted that it is not in light of any accident that a thing is 
said to act by its nature. This would entail that any kind of function or output that 
resulted from an accidental arrangement would not be a movement “by nature” but 
only those truly proper to the nature of the given natural object: that is, such 
functions would not be ​per se ​movements of a natural substance.  
This is explained by Aristotle’s use of a contrasting example. If a doctor were 
to treat himself as a patient, he would be not be healed ​in so far ​as he is the patient 
but insofar as he “possesses the art of medicine”.  That is, it is not himself ​qua 101
patient that the man cures, but rather that the man ​qua ​doctor cures himself ​qua 
patient. The principle of change (viz. the power to heal) is then not the result of the 
100
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man being a patient, but rather a consequence of what Aristotle calls: a “concomitant 
attribute".  
102
 In other words, a disposition ​p​ is an internal disposition of substance ​q ​if and 
only if it is a consequence of ​q ​qua ​q ​and not the consequence of something 
concomitant to ​q​. For example, the disposition of rising above water is internal to 
olive oil, in so far as it is because it is oil that it rises to the surface. If, however, a 
stone were to be placed in some buoyant mechanism which lifted it from the bottom 
of a lake, the stone’s rise is not the result of the stone ​qua ​stone but rather a result of 
its location within the mechanism.  
Aristotle extends this analysis to “all artificial products” which would seem to 
suggest nature was differentiated by the lack of art in its production.  Thus it is as if 
103
we have a classical formulation of Nature(1) and have again identified nature with 
what is not humanly produced. However, this is not the case, as St. Thomas Aquinas 
explaining this passage notes: “But things which are not from nature, such as bed 
and clothing and like things, which are spoken of in this way because they are from 
art, have in themselves no principles of mutation except ​per accidens​, insofar as the 
matter and substance of artificial bodies are natural things”.  In other words, the 
104
concern with “artificial products” is not their origin but their lack of internal 
principles of motions ​qua​ artifacts. It is merely through the principles of the natural 
things of which they are composed that they have any principles of motion at all. It is 
not in virtue of the hammer ​qua ​hammer that it has its firmness, but rather it is a 
property borrowed from the material from which its head was made. 
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With this in mind, one can make sense of Aristotle's description of the senses 
in which something may lack an internal principle. Aristotle writes of the 
aforementioned artificial products that “none of them has in itself the source of its 
own production".  Now, at first read, this would seem to apply to everything, since 
105
nothing is its own cause (in an existential sense). So there must be a softer reading of 
“source of its own production".  
Thus, St. Thomas notes that there are two principles in natural things: both 
active and passive.  It is in virtue of the active principle that things are inclined to 
106
move, and the passive by which things are inclined to be moved. However, lest this 
be thought to include any motion to which a natural object is subject, it is important 
to note what distinguishes natural passivity from other forms of a passivity for 
Aristotle.  
As Fr. Weisheilp notes there are three passivities that need to be 
distinguished: “(i) for compulsory movement: (ii) for artistic formation: and (iii) for 
natural production”.  The first of these is simplest. As happens frequently, the 
107
dispositions of one thing are overcome by some overwhelming external force. A stone 
is dispositionally directed towards sinking in water or falling through the air, that 
disposition can be overwhelmed by a person throwing the rock into the air. That this 
does not annihilate the intrinsic disposition is evident by the return of the stone to its 
proper motion once the violence has left it. So the stone neither has a ​natural 
passivity for those movements, nor does it exchange its internal disposition for the 
violent movement.  
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The passivity for artistic formation is the potential of one natural object to 
enter into an accidental unity with other natural objects. The natural object then may 
be moved in new ways but only from its unity within the artistic formation that it has 
these new movements. Consequently, it is not the stone ​qua ​stone that has these new 
motions but only the stone as a part of the whole. Momentarily, though, the 
distinction between the movement of a natural object according to its nature or 
concomittally by virtue of its place in an accidental unity will have to be put aside, 
since it is needful to first understand what the natural passivity it is being contrasted 
with means.  
The natural passivity of a natural object is that by which it intrinsically tends 
towards a particular aim. To be consistent with an example, the disposition of the 
rock towards sinking in a lake, or to drop through the air to the surface of the earth, 
are intrinsic aims of its nature. In this particular example, the movements are 
spontaneous​.  A stone being actually a stone is sufficient to ensure that 108
spontaneously it will sink in a body of water; likewise, it is sufficient for oil to be oil 
to ensure it will rise in a body of water.  
It may seem like this excludes the growth of living beings from being natural, 
but that is not the case. It is true that in addition to the nature of the young antelope 
various externals are required to ensure that the antelope matures into an adult. 
However, the assimilation of the food and water into antelope will still act according 
to its nature rather than that of some other animal. A young antelope will not grow 
the trunk of an elephant or the shell of an armadillo, but will, as much as its 
resources allow, manifest its intrinsic disposition to a certain pattern of growth.  
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 It is in regards to this lattermost sense of passivity that St. Thomas writes: 
“this principle in so far as it has a natural potency for such a form and motion makes 
the motion to be natural”.  An acorn would be taken to possess in itself a passive 
109
principle by which it is oriented towards becoming a mature oak. While this principle 
is passive and potential such that it needs to still be moved by something already 
actual (rain, sunlight, dirt, etc) there is truly something natural, that is internal, to 
the acorn such that its development into a sapling and eventually a full tree is seen as 
an unfolding of its inner nature. 
Not so with the clock or the bicycle. For in both cases the form of the clock or 
the bicycle is not the unfolding of a natural potency present in the material elements; 
rather it is an externally imposed arrangement.  It is worth noting the emphasis 
110
then is on the ​externality ​of these arrangements, not their origin from human or 
non-human agents. If one were to discover an alien planet filled with clocks and 
bicycles made by the dominant species of that planet, they would still be only 
accidental arrangement of parts. 
 In fact, the same would be true in a case where no intelligent agent was 
involved. If a whirlwind passing through a junkyard were, against all odds, to bring 
together various parts into a functional automobile, the automobile would remain 
only an accidental arrangement. That the whirlwind could be described as natural is 
simply irrelevant, because it is still a force external to the parts which it assembles. 
Furthermore, the parts themselves, even though overcome by the force of the 
whirlwind, lack any internal tendencies towards the new arrangement, and would 
not ever find that arrangement without intelligence or great violence.  
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So in contrast to natural objects which have their principle of production, at 
least passively, in themselves, Aristotle defines two ways in which something might 
lack the principle in question. Firstly, as in the above-discussed examples, something 
lacks an internal principle of production if it is produced entirely by an external 
cause. Aristotle’s own example is a house, the materials of which lack any natural 
111
tendency to come together as a house; however, there is no need to rely on 
anthropogenic examples. In addition to the above incredibly improbable example of 
a whirlwind, one might consider a beaver’s dam. A beaver dam on the same principle 
lacks an internal principle of production. Whereas Vogel believed that beaver dams 
are “presumably” natural, Aristotle would seem to say ​qua ​dams, they are not.  112
There is another sense in which something may lack an internal principle; 
namely, it may be present in the thing by virtue of a part rather than the whole. Thus 
the object in question can be said to contain a nature ​per accidens ​or concomittally 
but not ​per se ​or primarily. This is illustrated by Aristotle’s previous example of a 
doctor who heals himself, as “the same being happens to be a doctor and to be cured, 
and he is cured in so far as he is sick” yet it does not happen always that that which is 
sick (and thus can be cured) is also a doctor.  St. Thomas notes the fire is a 
113
counterexample to this, as it is natural to fire to move up through the air as 
“lightness” is not separate from the “body” which is moved, but they are always one 
and the same.  In contrast to the patient who is cured because ​per happenstance​,​ ​he 114
is also a doctor, the fire is moved upwards because to be fire is ​always ​to be the thing 
111
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which is lighter than air.  
115
From these discussions, a certain picture of what Aristotle means by nature 
emerges. As already stated, natural objects are always going to be subjects. That is, 
they will not be something to be found in another substance as an accident. 
Nevertheless, nature is going to be manifest in the natural movements of those 
natural objects. That is, whereas one finds many subjects in the world, and many of 
these subjects are natural ​qua ​natural objects, it is only the movements of the natural 
objects which follow from the dispositions of their natures ( i.e. those movements 
which manifest each natural object’s ​properties​) which are called natural. 
Further, in light of the stipulations for which a principle can be seen to be 
internal, there must be something ​real ​in the sense of not built about the nature of 
natural objects. That is to say, if the natural object’s nature is entirely caused and 
dependent upon human activity or thought then it cannot be seen as internal to the 
natural object. Nature in itself is not the result of external forces, but has reality in 
the natural object itself independent of external influence from humans or 
non-humans 
At the same time, however, there is nothing about this reality that entails it 
must be fragile. Whereas for McKibben, the independence of nature was such that its 
existence in nature was threatened, and even exterminated, by human interaction, 
human artifacts for Aristotle do not entirely escape being natural. Indeed, they are 
115
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not natural ​qua ​artifacts, but there are elements of the nature of the parts of the 
artificial product still operating under the externally imposed form.  
This may seem somewhat obscure, but at its root, the distinction denies that a 
substance is numerically identical with itself and its accidents. That is to say, 
substance plus accidents is something more than substance ​qua ​substance. The 
former is what Oderberg refers to as an ​accidental object​.  He uses the example of a 116
fist; a fist cannot be said to be a hand simply, but is a “hand taken with its mode of 
being clenched”.  Even though the hand and the fist (at least for the duration of the 
117
fist’s existence) are spatially and temporally coincident, this does not entail identity. 
As Oderberg points out, the shape and colour of a sphere are spatially and temporally 
coincident, but clearly not identical.  Granted then what has already been said to 
118
distinguish a substance and its accidents, it must follow that the accidental unity is 
not identical with the substance. The hand considered in itself is independent of its 
mode of being as a fist, but the hand is still an inseparable part of the fist 
nonetheless. Thus it is with other accidental objects, they are, ​qua ​accidental objects, 
not themselves the substances or natures, but depend on their substances for 
existence. 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest there is not something important about 
encountering natural objects as natural objects rather than as components of an 
unnatural ​qua ​artifact composite. Nevertheless, the value, and perhaps propriety, of 
seeing and thinking of nature in terms of natural objects left to their own movements 
does not exclude the existent natural principles operating in artifacts. Thus, Aristotle 
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would be unlikely to have the same quibbles about natural restoration that McKibben 
and Katz did.  
If nature is not destroyed by composition into artificial products, it would not 
be destroyed by other less intrusive human actions.  For example, if it is natural for 
119
a rock to sink in water, being placed on the surface of a lake by a human hand will not 
make the descent any less a manifestation of its internal principle. Likewise, a 
home-owner watering her garden and lawn is aiding, but not contradicting, the 
nature of her vegetation to grow.  
Additionally, natural objects ​qua ​natural objects must be to some extent 
simple. That is, a natural object will be integrated together such that in its 
movements it functions as a single whole. If an object is complex ​and unintegrated​, 
then its movements are going to be derived from its parts. For example, a tangle of 
various plants will not be able to function as a single natural object, because each 
plant will continue to move according to its own internal principles rather than 
according to any principle shared by the tangle as such. Thus if the tangle is moved in 
any direction or altered in any way, it will not be because of the tangle itself but on 
account of the individually acting parts. It is only in the case of simple things like fire 
or a homogeneous portion of oil that the motions of the object in question are going 
to always be the result of the object ​per se​.  
Section III: The Relative Simplicity of Animals 
There is something of a complication to this criterion, however. As Aristotle 
119
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notes he includes in his catalogue of what exists “by nature” animals and plants.  
120
Yet, animals and plants are themselves generally composed of heterogeneous parts. 
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to treat an animal as a single subject having a nature 
because despite the heterogeneity of its parts the animal has a single ​ψυχή; ​that is an 
anima ​or soul.  
Aristotle notes that the ​ψυχή ​is the “first grade of actuality of a natural body".
 It is by virtue of the soul that the body acts as a unity, and thus a body which is 
121
ensouled is one which is organized (ie. its organs function together).  For this 
122
reason, that is the essential unity provided by the soul, one can speak of animals as 
relatively simple despite their heterogeneous parts. Thus Aristotle also writes that the 
soul is the “essential whatness” of a living thing.  Thus, the composition of the 
123
different parts of an animal into a single whole is different, and more stable, than the 
composition found in artificial products. For this reason, an animal or a plant may be 
treated as simple, relative to non-natural objects. 
However, lest Aristotle be accused of being outdated on this point, it is 
incumbent upon the Neo-Aristotelian to give an account of why any organism should 
be held to be a single substance united by a soul. The functional unity of the various 
parts of an animal would seem inadequate to require such a principle since it is not 
posited in the case of the complex functional unity of machines. Likewise, in the case 
of colonial organisms whose parts are interdependent zoöids each with its own DNA 
code, it would seem that no single unitary principle is necessary.  
120
 Aristotle, ​Physics ​II.1 192b5-8 
121
 Aristotle, On the Soul trans. J. A. Smith in ​The Basic Works of Aristotle ​ed. Richard McKeon (New 
York, Random House, 2001), ​II.1 412a29-30 
122
 ​Ibid​, ​II.1 412a30-412b1. 
123
 ​Ibid​, ​II.1 412b13. 
46 
For example, the Portuguese man o’war would seem a counterexample to 
Aristotle’s view that animals have a single soul joining them as an organism. The 
Portuguese man o’war can function very much like a single animal of a particular 
species would, but since it is, in fact, composed of zoöids of distinct species, it would 
seem not to be a natural species in Aristotle’s sense. Since each zoöid is its own 
organism, it is certain that the Portuguese man o’war does not have a single vital 
principle even if the mutual dependency of the parts makes independent survival ​de 
facto​ highly improbable.  
However, the reasons why the Portuguese man o’war seems not to have a 
single soul ​ ​are the very reasons why it would seem other animals (and perhaps the 
individual zoöids of the Portuguese man o’war) must have this single unitary 
principle. The ​conceptual ​possibility of the zoöids of the Portuguese man o’war 
separating and continuing to live as the particular zoöid each is, marks them as 
different from the parts of other animals. The paws of a racoon or the tail of a lynx 
cannot be conceived of as alive apart from their place in the single organism to which 
they are a part.  
In summary, a natural object must be subject. It must have a nature which is 
in it independent of external imposition, but also not so fragile that human 
interaction ​per se ​extinguishes it. Lastly, a natural object must be either simple or 
composed in such a way that it acts as a unity, rather than a complex assembly of 
individual parts.  
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CHAPTER V: NATURE(3) AND CAUSALITY 
After discussing nature ​per se​, Aristotle moves on to look at nature in respect 
to the various causes. Namely, nature as it is to be understood through the material, 
formal, and final causes  of things. That is not, however, to say that nature is 
124
described by the four causes as a particular object might be (e.g. nature is not 
composed of a material cause like a statue is composed of bronze). Rather it is in 
light of the four categories of causes that one can speak of the nature of a thing. 
Section I: Nature as Material Cause 
Aristotle moves on in his investigation of the question of nature, as is his 
custom, by looking to his predecessors for what has already been said on the topic. 
First, following Antiphon and others Aristotle notes that some have said that the 
nature of a thing is “that immediate constituent of it which taken by itself is without 
arrangement, e.g. wood is the nature of ‘bed’”.  That is, nature is taken to be the 
125
material cause of a thing. The bed’s nature is its constitutive elements, e.g. “wood” for 
its boards, perhaps “metal” for the nails holding it together, or any other underlying 
elements. For planks are only referred to as “planks” when wood has been shaped a 
certain way (specifically by some ​extrinsic​ force) so the term plank never describes 
something without arrangement (in the relevant sense).  
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However, this does not settle the issue if the constitutive elements at one level 
are themselves composed of constitutive elements. That is, at what point are the 
parts unities which can be called substances, rather than the arrangement of more 
fundamental parts. Thus, for some, wood would not be taken to be substance by 
Aristotle’s contemporaries because they believed it was composed of some admixture 
of the four elements: earth, fire, water, and air.  In which case then, wood itself 
126
would seem not to be without arrangement, but rather the result of an arrangement 
of more basic elements. 
This raises the question of composition, for it is not obvious that the 
arrangement of the elements which form wood is the same kind of arrangement 
involved in constructing a bed. It will, however, suffice for the present purposes to 
note that whether or not the bed’s nature terminates in the wood of its planks or the 
elements composing the wood, there is a termination in the analysis of the material 
cause. 
It should be noted, however, that while the traditional list of elements has 
been thoroughly discredited, the difficulty at issue is not solved by a more thorough 
list of elements. Whether wood is composed of earth and other elements, or carbon 
and other atomic elements, the issue still remains whether or not the wood can be 
treated as “nature” ​qua ​wood, or whether it must be nature ​qua ​carbon.  
 In summary, Aristotle offers the following sense of nature to be derived from 
the above discussion of material causes: “This then is one account of ‘nature’, namely 
that it is the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a 
principle of motion or change".  Whether nature ​qua ​material cause is found at the 127
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level of elements, or at some level of composition is still an open question. The only 
indication of where the answer will be is the phrase “principle of motion or change”, 
that is, if composition changes what the principles of motion are for a given thing, 
then it follows that that level of composition is the relevant point to which the natural 
qua ​material cause refers. For example, if it is from wood ​qua ​wood that a chair 
derives its “principle of motion or change” then it is to wood that the nature of the 
chair ​qua ​material cause is referring. Properly, the chair itself is not a natural object 
and does not have a nature ​as such​; however, it does have as its material cause 
natural objects (e.g. wood) which do have natures. What is meant is that the wood 
which does have a nature stands in relation to the chair as if it were a material cause. 
Likewise, if it is determined that the wood does not impart the principles of motion, 
but rather it is the elements in the wood, then it will be those elements which are the 
nature of the chair in the relevant sense.  
Section II: Nature as Formal Cause 
Aristotle notes that one might alternatively find nature in the formal cause. 
Particularly, Aristotle is concerned with the form “which is specified in the definition 
of the thing".  That is to say, not just any shape or form, but the primary one by 
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which the natural object is referred. For example, a dog may be large, black, hairy, 
and many other things, but when it is referred to it is referred to by its primary form: 
dog. It is only black as a black dog, and it is only tall or hairy as a tall or hairy dog. It 
is very ​odd​ to say “it is a black that is dog”, and thus the priority of the form from 
which the definition of a thing is derived is made clear. Thus the relevant formal 
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cause is the substantial form by which something is a natural kind, i.e. the secondary 
sense of substance.  
As Aristotle notes it is inappropriate, except in a secondary sense, to refer to 
things which are in potency in regards to something as in fact being that thing. 
Rather, it is more appropriate to refer to something as ​x ​when it is ​x ​in actuality. 
Thus, he writes: “what is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own ‘nature’, and 
does not exist ‘by nature’, until it receives the form specified in the definition...".  
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Put another way, any given thing is only ​actually ​natural in so far as it has actually 
received the form of a species of a kind of natural object. As St. Thomas notes, it is in 
respect to form that a thing is in act, but it is in respect to matter that a thing is in 
potency.  That is because matter receives form, but does not exist without it.  In 
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other words, matter determines the possibility of what forms are to be received, thus 
grounding the potency of the hylemorphic substance, whereas the form determines 
what the hylemorphic substance is actually in the moment. Thus, Aristotle concludes 
something is more properly called natural in virtue of its formal rather than material 
cause.  
This contrasts with and helps explain the previous example of nature as the 
material cause. In the case of the bed, the bed did not contain within itself its own 
principles of production, and thus the level of nature was lower in the composition 
than the accidental form which was the bed. However, in the examples Aristotle gives 
in describing nature as a formal principle, the lower elements do not in fact have 
individual principles of motion. Whether or not nature is to be found in the whole or 
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the parts is then hemmed in on both sides, but that opens the question as to why. 
As mentioned above this pertains to a somewhat difficult question of 
composition. If Aristotle is right to distinguish between artificial products (e.g. beds, 
cloaks) and natural objects, there must be some sense in which they ​qua ​artificial 
products do not integrate their parts together as things held to be substances. To 
investigate this issue fully, a discursus will need to be made into the concept of ​prime 
matter ​in the thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas. 
S​ection III: Prime Matter 
Prime matter is materiality with no formality whatsoever. As stated above, the 
formal cause is for Aristotle and St. Thomas the source of a being’s ​act​. Thus in so far 
as prime matter is matter utterly deprived of form, it is also utterly deprived of act. 
Yet, prime matter cannot be taken to be pure non-being, since it would be senseless 
to attempt to grasp at the essence of non-being. Rather, the prime matter must only 
be a non-being in a qualified sense, to borrow a distinction from ​On Generation and 
Corruption​.  That is, prime matter is not ​non-being per se ​but being entirely ​in 132
potency​.  
This difference is not irrelevant. It is important to note though, that St. 
Thomas does not hold prime matter to be something one encounters in the world in 
the same way one encounters form-matter composites. He argues that potency is 
absolutely posterior to act: “For although in any single thing that passes from 
potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, 
absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality 
132
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can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality”.  That is to say, if 
133
potency was prior  to actuality absolutely, then there would never be anything 
134
reduced from potency to act, and consequently there would be no act. There are 
things in act, consequently there must have been act prior to potency.  Thus it is 
135
never the case that one finds potency in isolation of act, potency is always the 
potency of something in act. 
If prime matter is not a thing encountered in the world, one must wonder to 
what the name even refers. St. Thomas explains the notion in his work ​The Principles 
of Nature ​where he distinguishes two notions of potency: potency to exist 
substantially and potency to exist accidentally.  He goes on to note that the potency 
136
to exist substantially is really the potency to receive a substantial form, and it belongs 
to matter when matter is considered as prime matter.  Alternatively, the potency to 
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receive an accident (that is potency to exist accidentally) belongs to matter ​qua 
subject implying something already in act. In both cases what is being received is a 
form, and thus form stands in relation to matter as act does to potency. For this 
reason, St. Thomas concludes that the form is the act of everything, and something is 
actually a thing in so far as it has a form.  So prime matter then is the potency of 
138
things to be things ​at all​, in contrast to matter in a secondary sense which is the 
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potency of things in act to change in some way.  
Following Eleanor Stump, it will be important that we look also to St. Thomas’ 
notion of an ​element​ to help make sense of the notion of prime matter he is using. 
When one speaks of the material cause of a given object, it is always relative to the 
object itself. As Stump reads St. Thomas the argument runs: “What counts as matter 
for a macro-level object may itself be organized or configured in a certain way".  For 
139
example, the material cause of a bike is the material which underlies it ​qua ​bike (e.g. 
the gears, seat, wheels, etc.) and not properly speaking the material causes of those 
parts (or the material causes of their respective material causes etc). However, the 
wheel by being affixed to the gears of a bike, does not cease to be a wheel. It is 
arranged in some functional unity with the other parts, but there is nothing of what 
made it a wheel before its entering into the assemblage that is lost or suppressed. 
Thus the material causes of the bike are themselves objects which are already ​in act 
to a significant extent, and cannot be taken as prime matter.  
In the case of elements, this is not the case. As Stump notes: “the lowest-level 
material component which counts as matter organized in a certain way is an 
element".  That is, the material composition of an element must itself not have any 
140
lower material causes. Bicycles then are certainly not elemental. The element then is 
nothing but form and prime matter.   
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Thus, a natural object is one whose underlying components are not 
themselves ​in act ​as other natural objects. One may say then that a single natural 
object is a substantial form joined to prime matter. The specification of the 
“substantial” form rather than accidental forms is on two accounts. Firstly, as 
Aristotle noted, it is the primary form by which something is designated, and this is 
the form by which it is a natural object. Secondly, accidents are accidents of a 
substance, ergo it is only in light of a substantial form that accidental forms can be.  
Section IV: Unity of Substantial Forms 
Now this raises the question about substantial change occurring in substances 
already in being. If a log is turned into ash, or hydrogen and oxygen are combined 
into water, the components (the carbon in the ash, the atoms of the water) were 
already in another state of ​act ​. However, it would seem counterintuitive to refer to 
ash or water as non-substances because it seems they are not assembled from things 
already in act in the same way a bed is.  
One might be tempted then to speak of a plurality of substantial forms. Rather 
than the hydrogen and oxygen losing their substantial forms as what they are, they 
merely gain a new form (water) when they enter into a particular configuration. In 
which case, a substantial form would be ​informing ​a set of parts already in act much 
like the parts of a bike were before assemblage.  
 This is problematic, however, from what has already been said. Aristotle 
denies the term natural object to the parts of substances and the heterogeneous 
compositions they enter into. For in Aristotle’s example of a bed, the substance is the 
wood which was shaped into the frame. The bed and the wood are not both 
substances, but only the more fundamental wood. Likewise, the wood would not be a 
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substance if its parts were themselves substances (i.e. had their own principles of 
motion and rest). Substance then is neither constitutive of other substances nor 
reducible to them.  
Another concern is the logical difficulties which result from attempting to 
posit multiple existing substantial forms in a single object. Feser gives the example of 
substance ​A ​which has parts ​B ​and ​C​. If ​B ​and ​C ​are substances, then ​A ​would be as 
an accidental form to them.  That is, since a substantial form is the form which 
142
grants actuality to be at all, rather than to be in such and such a manner, something 
governing over parts which already have substantial forms cannot itself be a 
substantial form. ​A ​would not be causing ​B ​or ​C ​to exist ​per se ​but could be causing 
them to exist in some particular way. 
However, this would entail a logical contradiction. It follows that ​A ​if it has 
parts which are substances that it only causes to exist in some particular way, it must 
be an accidental form. But since ​A ​cannot be at the same time and in the same 
respect both a substance and an accident, ​A ​then could not also be a substantial form. 
Thus, it must be affirmed that every natural object has a ​single ​substantial form, 
regardless of how many and diverse its accidental forms are.  
It may be objected that even if ​A ​is an accidental form in respect to ​B ​and ​C​, 
this does not entail it is in the same respect a substantial form. Thus there can be 
multiple substantial forms in a single natural object because the substantiality and 
accidentiality of any particular form will be in different respects. Thus, the principle 
of noncontradiction will be preserved.  
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Nevertheless, this apparent solution is not satisfying. For ​A ​to be a substantial 
form, it has to be a substantial form of something. For in the case of hylemorphic 
composites, substantial forms do not exist without matter.  So if ​A ​is not the 143
substantial form of its parts, it is not clear of what ​A ​can be said to be a substantial 
form. In which case, the options are either the contradiction entailed by positing ​B 
and ​C​ to which ​A ​is both a substance and accident, or the negation of ​A​’s 
substantiveness since it cannot be a substantial form of nothing.  
So if ​B ​and ​C ​cannot exist as substances under ​A​, it seems difficult to 
understand how two substances (e.g. two atoms) can join to form a new substance 
(e.g. a molecule). A useful tool for this quandary can be found in the traditional 
distinction between existing ​actually ​or in an unqualified sense, and existing 
virtually. ​This the same distinction which Aristotle uses to overcome Zeno’s paradox 
of parts; it is not that the infinity of infinitesimal parts of a whole are present ​in act 
(that is, as if an infinite series of individual things) in the whole, but the parts are 
virtually present in the whole.  That is to say, while the whole ​could ​be divided 144
repeatedly, in the moments in which it is a whole those parts do not exist as 
independent things. This is why it is possible to cross a finite distance in a finite 
amount of time, because while the distance is virtually divisible ​ad infinitum ​it is 
only ​in act ​a finite distance.  
If the previous substances remained ​in act ​rather than virtually in any new 
substance formed through substantial change, one would expect their principles of 
motion and rest to be exhibited by the new substance. This is not the case. If 
143
 Notwithstanding the cases of a separated human soul or an angelic substantial form, both of which 
are outside the realm of the objects of physics and without relationship to my current purposes. 
144
 Feser, ​Aristotle’s Revenge​, 27.  
57 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms are brought together to form H​
2​O molecules, one will 
notice that the new molecules do not exhibit all the causal properties of their atomic 
components (e.g. H​
2​O is liquid under conditions at which hydrogen and oxygen 
would be gas).  
In summary, everything which is a natural object is a subject with a singular 
substantial form and has consequent irreducible principles of rest and motion. These 
principles of motion are irreducible in so far as they are the principles of motion of 
the thing ​per se ​such that when it moves according to them it is moving as itself 
rather than moving concommitally. In the latter case are the movements of 
machines, since machines ​qua ​machines do not have irreducible principles of 
motion. Instead the parts of machines have their own substantial forms or can be 
further broken down into parts which do and in consequence their own principles of 
motion which are sufficient to explain the motions of the whole. 
Section V: Substantial Forms and Final Causes 
The Aristotelian tradition also highlights how nature pertains to the final 
cause. The final cause is whatever a thing is directed to as its perfection in light of the 
type of thing it is. Consequently, it is from the nature of a natural object that its final 
cause is derived.  
This is because the formal cause entails also the proper dispositions and 
accidents of a natural substance. In so far then as a natural object has one nature in 
light of its one substantial form, it follows then that it has only one set of proper 
accidents. For example, since fire is substantially ​fire ​and only fire then it is only the 
accidents proper to fire which can be considered its natural properties. Insofar as 
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these properties include dispositions (rising upwards, heating the surrounding area 
etc.) the fire manifesting these properties can be said to be acting naturally.  
As Fr. Weisheipl notes “Nature is a source not only of activity but also of rest. 
This should be understood not as the mere absence of activity but as the positive 
possession of fulfillment”.  That is to say, that in so far as nature includes immanent 
145
principles of motion ​and rest ​,​ ​it has normative value in that it is by its nature that a 
natural object has its principle of self-fulfillment.  
In the case of inanimate things, this self-fulfillment may be simply a relative 
position of stability, that is the Aristotle sense of a “natural place”. Now, firstly, it is 
obviously false today that there is any ​absolute ​sense to the phrase “natural place” as 
in the geocentric system, where each of the  five elements corresponds to a certain 
portion of the cosmos. Nevertheless, it is just as evident today as it was for Aristotle 
that there are configurations of natural objects which are stable and those which are 
not. Fire will move upwards, oil will rise above water, and rocks will sink. 
Countervailing circumstances can always prevent these ends from being realized, but 
they are dispositions of natural objects.  
Thus, there is a sense in which one can speak of certain positions as being the 
cause of the motion of inanimate things, but not as efficient causes, as Roger Bacon 
suggested, but rather as the “intended” end of the “formal and active principle” of a 
thing’s nature.  Thus, since in light of its active principle it is proper to a stone to 
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sink in a lake, its relative natural place at the bottom of the lake is the final end of its 
motion.  
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In the case of living things that go through a natural process of growth, the 
sense of final causality is more interesting. St. Thomas explains: “Everything is said 
to be good in so far as it is perfect... a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing 
according to the mode of its perfection”.  Which is to say, something is perfect 
148
according to the particular mode of perfection proper to it. Thus, it is not a deficiency 
in a hummingbird that it lacks the powerful legs of an ostrich, nor is it an 
imperfection for an ostrich that it cannot fly. It is only because for a hummingbird to 
be a ​perfect ​hummingbird that it must fly 
Therefore, the development of a hummingbird from a nestling to an adult who 
instantiates the various properties which allows the hummingbird to flourish is then 
a process of perfecting. This process of course can be terminated by death, or 
impeded by violence, but in so far as the nestling becomes that mature hummingbird 
that nestling has been ​perfected​. Thus, Philippa Foot argues it is useful to note the 
properties which when properly manifest are important to a species’ life-cycle.  
Thus Philippa Foot argues that one can derive an account of “Natural 
Goodness” from what she refers to as “Aristotelian categoricals".  For a particular 
149
property ​p ​to be an Aristotelian categorical, it must be the case that ​p ​is a property 
generally  shared by members of a species ​s ​and ​p​ contributes to the ability of ​s ​to 150
maintain its life cycle.  For example, the hard-shell and ability to curl into a ball of 
151
some hypothetically super dense liquid substance at the bottom of the lake through which it does not 
sink, but in each case the “natural place” is understood only in terms of the system of substance in 
which the stone is interacting, rather than some cosmic order.  
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the Brazilian three-banded armadillo are two properties that the species possesses 
for its survival, and in consequence, it is “good” when a particular armadillo can 
manifest these properties.  
Since it has already been said that every natural object has a single substantial 
form, it will always be the case that a single set of properties will constitute the 
Aristotelian categoricals of a given natural object. That set then is normative as to 
what an optimal example of particular species is. Thus, there is an intelligible (if 
difficult to discover) good for any given natural object, which results not from the 
extrinsic influence of human beings but is a result of its ​immanent ​principles of 
motion and rest. On these grounds, Nature(3) offers some account of both why one 
can speak intelligibly of nature, and why one ​ought ​to be concerned about that 
nature. 
Section VI: Application 
If then we approach the environment as an area where various species may 
manifest their unique forms of goodness then the idea of nature (viz. Nature(3)) 
provides something of a norm. One ought to value that various species of living 
things manifest their unique ​φύσις ​by developing their forms of goodness. A living 
thing which manifests its unique ​φύσις ​will be a living thing which best exemplifies 
those traits which are naturally good for it as a member of a species.  Thus, the good 
which such a living being would manifest would be the good of being a good 
particular of ​x ​species. Since  human nature itself has a ​φύσις​, it is also ​natural ​and 
unable to climb a tree to escape predators, but it is still not good. Secondly, in the sense of humans, 
what is most vital to our life is, as as Foot following Geach notes, virtues. (Foot 34) That is to say, it 
does not follow that because a human being deviates from peak physical or mental health that she is 
somehow failing an Aristotelian categorical. As social animals, humans can accommodate such 
differences; however, the ability to integrate into society with a ​virtuous character ​is a moral 
imperative.  
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acceptable to include in our concerns over nature and the environment that the 
conditions for fulfilling human potential be included. 
Thus one might say there is some ​presumptive ​good  to the good of living 152
things other than humans. That is, there is some ​non-instrumental ​good in allowing 
for the flourishing of non-human natural objects to obtain. In fact, there may be 
some presumptive good even in the case of inanimate objects which tend towards 
some position of rest. However, human beings are natural too, and Vogel is quite 
right to reject any dualism which holds that humans ​per se ​are not natural. Thus 
there is weight to our ​own ​good as well. 
Therefore, just as it does not happen that the good of one animal is always in 
line with the good of another, there are going to be occasions when human 
flourishing requires, or at least justifies, the disruption of the goods of natural 
objects. One may need to kill animals for food or clothing, or disrupt the elements 
and their relative positions to build some useful human artifact. Nevertheless, in 
these cases, it is incumbent upon humans to consider the natural goodness of the 
things being acted upon. One may not be required to spare an animal’s life at all 
costs, but the presumptive value that its manifestation of its species’ unique 
perfection would seem a weighty enough concern to rule out all frivolous and aimless 
152
 Granting that the good of each species is not equal (e.g. there is more weight to the flourishing of a 
giraffe than that a stone in its relative position of rest), it needs to be asked if the presumptive weight 
of the good of each member of a species is equal. For example, does a maimed lion which cannot 
pounce impose on us as much as a paradigmatic example of a lion in its prime. The answer, I believe, 
is yes. For what is really given value is the process by which a thing flourishes. Thus a new born lion is 
not valued less (in the relevant sense) because it is not yet the paradigmatic example of its species. 
Rather, it is precisely because those processes by which it obtains to its natural perfection are occuring 
in the cub, even though they have not brought it about to the perfect degree, that imposes upon us 
some value. Likewise, even if the development of the cub were indefinitely delayed because of some 
injury or ailment, the fact that in so far as the cub is alive and thus obtaining to its perfection as much 
as is possible in those circumstances that we allot to the cub the same value we do other members of 
the species.  
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attempts to destroy it.  
Section VII: Nature(3) v. Nature(1) 
Therefore, we have strong grounds to insist that Nature(3) is not captured by 
the notions of Nature(1) or Nature(2) and consistently does not automatically fall to 
the criticisms leveled against them. 
As noted already, Nature(3) is not a fragile sense of nature. While Nature(3) is 
not inextinguishable, it is also not something to which the slightest interference of 
human beings is a threat. A person may go into the wood and feed the deer without 
said deer becoming ​unnatural​. The fact that the food was provided to the deer will 
not change the fact that the incorporation of that food into the deer’s body will occur 
according to the particular metabolism of a deer which will allow it to move towards 
its own perfection, which is the perfection of the particular natural kind it is.  
Some human action ​does ​result in violent as opposed to natural movement in 
natural objects. For example, a human may, as opposed to feeding a deer, shoot and 
kill it. In which case, not only did the human act contrary to the deer’s own tendency 
towards self-perfection, but acted so violently that the deer was destroyed. However, 
since this is only a subset of human actions, it does not follow that Nature(3) 
excludes ​per se ​human action, and in this respect it cannot be identified with 
Nature(1).  
In a sense the possibility for human cooperation with nature is the 
counterpoint of the ability of natural processes to produce things which are not 
themselves natural. For example, “a heap of stones” formed by a rockslide or “a 
group of liana vines which by chance has grown into a hammock-like arrangement” 
would not be human artifacts, yet their peculiar formations are accidents rather than 
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derived from their internal motive principles.  The stones which compose the heap 
153
certainly are natural objects, but as they have no internal principle by which they 
form a heap, the heap itself is not natural. If then not everything produced by 
non-human processes is “natural” as Nature(1) would seem to suggest, it need not 
follow either that all human actions, even technical human actions, produce things 
which are not natural.  
Section VIII: Nature (3) v. Nature(2) 
Additionally, Nature(3) is distinct from Nature(2). Since Nature(3)’s contrary 
is the “accidental”, many things (heaps, hammocks, coats, beds) fall out of nature 
without becoming “supernatural” or violating the laws of physics. Yet this raises 
another question. If a bed is only able to exhibit the properties it does because those 
properties are natural to its parts, it would seem to follow the ​bedness ​of the “bed” 
was merely a construction of pragmatic value but not something with its own 
existence.  
In response, I believe two reasons can be given for affirming that the attribute 
of bedness truly does exist in the bed. Firstly, if one wishes to deny that accidental 
unities (such as those found in artifacts) are ​real​, one will have to deny any accident 
being a true predicate of any subject. Just because bedness does not exist in the same 
way that a primary substance or secondary substance exists does not mean it does 
not exist at all. It only exists in a substance, but that is a distinct mode of being rather 
than an absence of existing.  
Secondly, the bed, or any other accidental form of its type, coordinates to a 
significant (but not irreducible) degree the motions of the substances under it. If the 
153
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liana vines are tangled together as a hammock, or tied together by some agent, it is 
only on account of this structure that the individual liana vines can support a body. 
While it is true that the weight-bearing properties and elasticity of the hammock are 
derived from the individual vines, it is nonetheless the case that cumulative effect 
comes from the accidental attribute of the hammock. It will be helpful to borrow the 
language of Nancy Cartwright; the hammock is what she might call a “nomological 
machine”  that is “a fixed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with 
154
stable (enough)” which in “stable (enough) environments” will exhibit a causal 
regularity.  Such machines “produce the causal relations they do because of the way 
155
the exercising of the various causal powers involved combine in the context of the 
machine to produce” the effects that they do.  That is to say, the nomological 
156
machine arranges the causal powers of its parts in a way that regularly produces a set 
of effects. These effects can, in fact, be new, as the parts of a toilet cistern produce an 
effect different from all its parts.  It remains the case, however, that the cistern is a 
157
composite in a way fire or an acorn is not. The cistern cannot be ignored since its 
reality is necessary to understand the causal regularities of the system; however, the 
various components of the cistern did not come together because of inherent 
154
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principles of each, nor is there something irreducible about the movements of the 
cistern.  
Section IX: The Charge of Ideology 
What remains then to be answered is Vogel’s charge of ideology. As was 
established in chapter III, Vogel’s accusation of ideology towards any particular view 
requires that the view in question be false, but also pertain to some deep facet of the 
status quo, and have problematic implications. I have already attempted to show that 
Nature(3) is not ruled out by any of Vogel’s arguments, and thus has some 
plausibility; however, rather than address the issue of the truth of Nature(3) any 
further, I believe Vogel’s charge of ideology can be answered in its other criteria.  
Firstly, one must exclude any defence of Nature(3) which relies on it not 
pertaining to some deep feature of the world. Nature(3) cannot be a mere marginal 
note or gloss on something else. Nature(3), if it is true, is the framework by which the 
wide category of nature is to be understood. Likewise, if it is false, it would disorient 
its adherents in a very serious way. Since Nature(3) is meant to convey normative 
significance, it can never be excused from a charge of ideology by a defence of 
superficiality.  
Rather, to defend Nature(3) from such a charge it must be established that 
Nature(3) either does not support the ​status quo ​or does not go against people’s true 
interests. I believe that there is a strong case to be made in both respects. 
Consequently, Nature(3) is not ideology.  
Nature(3) does not support the ​status quo ​as can be seen by drawing out what 
the normative implications of Nature(3) are. The relevant portion of the ​status quo 
that Vogel was critical of in respect to his critique of the concept of nature was that 
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human beings were treated as something outside of nature.  This, however, is not a 
158
conclusion which can be derived from Nature(3).  
Nature(3) holds that human beings in so far as “human” is a natural kind are 
themselves natural. Furthermore, as stated above, since what is natural to any given 
thing is some motion to which it is disposed, if a human being co-operates with these 
natural motions a human being can even ​aid ​nature. The false dichotomy between 
humans and nature which Callicot laments as preventing meaningful environmental 
action in the “four-dimensional, inherently dynamic landscapes” where we find 
ourselves in the 21st century, is absent from Nature(3).  And insofar as this is 
159
precisely what Vogel takes to be the ​status quo ​ worth criticizing, Nature(3) is 
delivered from any criticisms of being ideological.  
Furthermore, Nature(3) does not fall on Vogel’s other sword. That is 
Nature(3) does not direct one away from true human natures. Since Nature(3) is 
concerned about things generally reaching their states of self-completion, Nature(3) 
can provide a basis for criticism when a society fails to take into account the things 
necessary for people (and where possible other things) to obtain their states of 
perfection. Thus incumbent upon a society which understands the world in light of 
an Aristotelian notion of nature is the obligation to seek the flourishing of all of its 
members.  Therefore, Nature(3) is not a forsaking of true human interests. 
160
158 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 7. 
159
 Qtd. in Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 6. 
160
 One may object that Aristotle himself did not apply his ideas in such a way. Quite famously, 
Aristotle was known to have supported slavery, and his philosophy has been used to justify the 
institution of slavery in the past. Nevertheless, while there is no denying that this is true of the past, 
Aristotle’s system is not limited to Aristotle’s own works. In fact, the expansive nature of 
Aristotelianism itself, the attempts of Aristotle to incorporate empirical observation, and the centuries 
of Aristotelian traditions invite the contemporary reader of Aristotle to depart from his text to look at 
new applications of the principles. Whereas Aristotle may have held to prejudicial views about the 
slaves of his time, in the light of the integration of the descendants of slaves into contemporary 
society, we, on the other hand, can with confidence assert that those who would have been slaves in 
67 
Conclusion 
Nature, then, is always predicated of a substance. A substance is always 
composed of matter, not otherwise ​in act​. That is, the parts of the substance are not 
themselves actually independent things at the same time they are in the substance. 
For this reason, the material cause of every substance is prime matter. 
Secondly, every substance has a ​single ​substantial form by virtue of which it is 
at all. This substantial form is that by which the particular substance is a member of 
a species, and thus is ​substance ​in the secondary sense as discussed in the last 
chapter. Following from the particular species of a thing are certain proper accidents 
and principles of movement and rest. These properties and principles carry with 
them normative value because they allow one to judge whether ​x ​is a good example of 
species ​S​. It is in respect to these that one can speak of the natural final cause of a 
natural object. Its final cause is to manifest the properties and movements which are 
derived from the essence of the type of thing it is.  
 Therefore, there is presumptive weight to allowing ​x ​to exhibit the properties 
and principles proper to it as an ​S​. The notion of nature then is highly relevant to 
environmental philosophy and policy. Moreover, since Nature(3) does not exclude 
human beings from the considerations of what is natural, it does not fall to Vogel’s 
ideological criticism.  
 
  
former eras share with us the same conditions of flourishing and in that respect are entitled by justice 
to the same societal benefits.  
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CHAPTER VI: ARISTOTLE AND VOGEL ON FINAL CAUSES AND ARTIFACTS 
The Aristotelian conception of nature is closely tied to a particular view of 
teleology, in light of which certain implications or evaluations of nature follow which 
would serve to aid discussions in environmental philosophy and policy. However, it 
is sometimes held that modern science has rendered superfluous the teleological 
conception of nature promoted from Aristotle to the medieval period. Whereas 
Aristotle held that teleology was necessary to explain the harmonious functionality of 
the heterogeneous parts of animals, it has been suggested that since Darwin such a 
hypothesis is unnecessary. Darwinian evolution at least seems to explain the 
apparent design of animals without reference to teleology. Therefore, it would seem 
that the blind operations of natural selection provide as good of an account of the 
natural world as Aristotle’s teleology; that is, unless they provide a better account.  
Section I: Vogel and Darwin 
In light of these conceptions, it may be understandable why Vogel does not 
directly address the Aristotelian conception of nature. Commenting on Katz’s 
attribution of teleology to artifacts but not natural objects, Vogel praises Katz’s 
position as “staunchly (and admirably) Darwinian".  That Vogel assumes the truth 
161
of Darwinianism to the exclusion of alternative views is also evident in his dismissal 
of McKibben’s dichotomy of human versus non-human as “Pre-Darwinian".  
162
However, ​Vogelian Darwinianism ​is itself not without problems.  
From the scattered references to Darwin in ​Thinking Like a Mall​, one can 
gather that Vogel sees Darwin as exorcising teleology (​of a sort​) from nature by 
showing apparent design is produced by chance and expunging dualism from 
161
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anthropology by showing that human beings are not qualitatively distinct from other 
species, but rather ascended to their place in the biosphere through many small 
quantitative adaptations.   
163
It should, however, be noted that Vogel is using the term “teleology” in a 
precise sense. He wants to distinguish between two sense of teleology: external and 
internal.  The former refers to teleology considered as the purpose for which 
164
something was created: e.g. a knife is built with the end of cutting in mind.  In 
165
contrast, internal teleology is just what purposes a thing has in virtue of its internal 
structure; e.g. sensitivity of a prey’s senses have the purpose of allowing it to escape 
predators often enough to survive as a species.  Vogel does believe that this second 
166
type of teleology can be spoken of intelligibly even by Darwinians, but it is rather the 
former kind of teleology that is ruled out. Since Darwinian theory holds that 
biodiversity is not the result of the intentional actions of an agent but rather the 
result of an unintelligent natural selection, there is no more room for teleology which 
is externally imposed by a designer with a particular end in mind. 
Vogel would seem then to be attacking ​intelligent design theory​, or the view 
that some grand designer created the things in the world with particular ends in 
view. For in the case of such a designer nature would truly be said to have an external 
163
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teleology just as Katz attributes to artifacts. This point is transparent in various 
arguments used by intelligent design advocates, and can be traced at least to William 
Paley’s famous “Watchmaker argument”.  
Paley’s argument relies on an analogy to be found in the design of a watch, 
and the apparent design of the universe. That is, since one analogue (the watch) is 
obviously designed, and thus is known to have a designer, the other analogue with all 
the apparent features of being designed likewise must have a designer. Paley’s 
description of the watch and its design both begins his argument and provides much 
insight into his idea of teleology. Paley goes at length to catalogue all the components 
and notes that they are “framed and put together for a purpose,” noting that each is 
“so formed and adjusted” as to carry out its purpose.  Paley is aware that the 
167
watch’s parts only have a teleology in so far as it is externally imposed by ​something 
which frames, puts together, forms, and adjusts. This all implies both agency and 
intelligence. 
Lest it be thought that Paley felt teleology was external in only one of his 
analogues, he explicitly links the externality of the teleology of the watch to the 
teleology of nature. For he writes: “ every indication of contrivance, every 
manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature".  
168
Further, he claims that whereas “the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances 
of art” nevertheless “[the contrivances of nature] are not less evidently mechanical, 
not less evidently contrivances".  That is, in Paley’s view the only teleology, in both 
169
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artifacts and nature, is the contrivances of some intelligent designer. Thus Paley 
writes: “CONTRIVANCE [sic], if established, appears to me to prove every thing 
which we wish to prove. Amongst other things, it proves the personality of the Deity”.
 That is to say, the apparent design of the universe is only explained by a personal 
170
being. 
Paley’s identification of teleology exclusively with external teleology entails 
that there must be some personal mind which imposes the teleological structure of 
nature onto it. Thus he writes: 
 Now that which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. 
These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and 
thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose; as well as 
the power of providing means, and of directing them to their end. They 
require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; 
which is mind.   
171
That is, the teleology of nature is explained, so says Paley, only by a mind which is 
qualitatively like a human mind, even if quantitatively much, perhaps even 
immeasurably, greater.  
The potentially problematic feature of Paley’s view, however, is that he posits 
a universe which is utterly devoid of internal teleology. Paley briefly considers that 
there may be some qualitative difference between the perceiving eye and the 
unperceiving telescope, but instead concludes that both are indeed “instruments".  
172
For something to be used as an instrument, however, implies that the ends in which 
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it is being used are not its own, or at the very least are besides its own. To water an 
oak sapling is not to make it into an instrument, but to dismember its branches to 
build a shelter would. In the latter case, the use of the oak’s parts (that is, the 
creation of the shelter) is completely external to the oak considered in itself. 
One might think that something can be an instrument and have internal 
teleology, and this is true in so far as an instrumental use of something with such 
internal teleology is insufficient grounds to deny that it does, in fact, have such a 
teleology. For example, if instead of dismembering the oak tree, one might integrate 
the still living trunk and branches into a constructed shelter. In which case, the oak 
tree’s parts will continue to operate according to the internal powers of the tree, but 
will also be instrumental in the extrinsic purpose imposed by the builder. Perhaps 
then, this is what Paley has in mind by referring to the eye as an instrument like the 
telescope. 
 I think this reading is unlikely. Firstly, if Paley meant that the eye’s internal 
teleology was integrated into the pursuit of an extrinsic end, the eye would not be an 
instrument in an unqualified sense. Rather, the eye would be only an instrument in a 
qualified sense, since properly speaking it is not an instrument but only being used 
instrumentally. Secondly, Paley’s own analogy would be undermined if the eye were 
taken to be an instrument in a qualified sense since his project is to identify the eye 
with the telescope. That the telescope is an instrument in an unqualified sense is a 
point which is taken by Paley to be uncontroversial.  Thirdly, Paley explicitly 
173
mentions what the difference between the eye and the telescope is: subtlety of design.
 If Paley took the eye to have some internal teleology, unlike the telescope, surely 
174
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he would have made that the point of distinction. Consequently, natural objects are 
for Paley just a set of artifacts made by a personal intellect which is quantitatively 
greater than any human mind.  
That this thesis was rendered obsolete by Darwin is seen in two ways. Firstly, 
Paley is making an ​a posteriori ​argument (much like Hume’s Cleanthes), and in 
consequence, gives a probabilistic and inductive argument. Since there was never any 
necessity in Paley’s argument it always was susceptible to any alternative hypothesis 
that could explain the same facts with as much or more evidence. Darwinism, 
because of its base in Darwin’s and other biologists’ observations, would seem 
comparable to Paley on this front. Secondly, since natural selection does not posit 
something above the natural world, Paley’s thesis of a super-intelligent entity would 
seem to fall to Ockam’s razor. 
It is important to note, however, that Vogel is not alone in rejecting the notion 
of a nature permeated with extrinsic teleology. In fact, Aristotelians and Thomists 
have been very critical of that very thesis. If one turns to ​Physics ​VIII, Aristotle notes 
that “that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly; 
for nature is everywhere the cause of order".  That is, it is nature as a genus of 
175
motion and not some directing intelligence (like Anaxgoras’ ​nous ​) which is the cause 
of order. For as has been amply discussed, if nature is taken to signify those 
dispositions by which something moves or is moved, then one would seem to have an 
explanation of the apparent order of the world without holding that there is an 
intelligent cause above it all.  
176
175
 Aristotle, ​Physics ​VIII 252a11-12. 
176
St. Thomas Aquinas does argue that even in the case of internal teleology that the end must be 
present ​somewhere​, but in that case, it would seem an unintelligent agent requires an Intelligence in 
which its end can virtually exist prior to its realization. This is the Thomistic position, but it is beyond 
74 
But as pointed out it is not this ​internal account ​of teleology which Vogel finds 
problematic to a Darwinian. Rather, it is the extrinsic teleology of even artifacts. 
Whereas I have so far emphasized that Aristotle held that nature does not generate 
things in the same way art does, it should be recalled Aristotle did hold that natural 
objects have a different kind of teleology than artifacts. Artifacts are those 
conglomerates which lack a unitary substantial form and are the product of art.  
This is where Vogel departs. The view that technology has this extrinsic 
teleology is what he finds so objectionable. Vogel writes: “the wild is there in ​all ​our 
acts, and in all our artifacts” and he continues “we cannot build without the 
employment of processes whose fundamental character​⁠—whose ​nature​, I might even 
be willing to say⁠— is not and cannot be fully known to us".  Vogel wants to do away 177
with a naive view of artifacts. Artifacts are not outside of nature, since their 
movements are a product of their underlying and, according to Vogel, ​unknowable 
nature, rather than one’s intentions.  
Now as I’ve discussed, the view that artifacts move in virtue of the natures of 
their parts is undoubtedly Aristotelian. Where Vogel goes further than Aristotle is 
that he seems to be suggesting not simply that the artifact is reducible to these 
natures, but that it can be treated as ​natural ​as a whole.  
 Vogel’s position is that the unity of an artifact is not different than the unity of 
a living animal. In Vogel’s only by-name reference to Aristotle, he has this to say 
the scope of my argument to scrutinize it. Aristotle does not use any such argument for a governing 
intelligence. (Feser, “Between Aristotle and Paley”, 718) Nor does St. Thomas’ argument line up with 
Paley’s, since St. Thomas does not reduce the things being moved to mere instruments of an extrinsic 
cause. For it is truly in the natural object to be directed towards its final cause, so St. Thomas holds, 
but it is because of the need for a determinate final cause that such a cause does pre-exist virtually in 
an intelligence. Paley in contrast, thinks that it is in light of contrivance that things function as they 
do, without any reference to internal principles of teleology. 
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“Aristotle, writing before Darwin, can be excused for believing there was something 
metaphysically unique about living things that nonliving ones (especially artifacts) 
simply lacked".  Elsewise put, Aristotle’s alleged ignorance was to treat the unity of 
178
living things as qualitatively distinct from the unity of artifacts.  
Bizarrely, the thrust of Vogel’s Darwinian critique is hyper-focused on the 
alleged “vitalism” of alternatives. Vogel suggests: “if we are Darwinians (and 
naturalists), and no longer believe living things to possess some sort of special spark 
or entelechy that would render them metaphysically unique, it isn’t clear what the 
principle is on the basis of which the desired distinction [between living things and 
artifacts] could be drawn here".  But it is not in virtue of things being living that 
179
Aristotelians attribute to them a non-accidental unity. Elements, as already 
discussed, are not living things, but are still substantial unities. It is sufficient that 
fire is moved in virtue of being fire that one can distinguish it from a hammer which 
is only moved accidentally in virtue of its parts. For this reason, Vogel’s contestation 
that, post-Darwin, we must abandon “nature” as having a “metaphysical or vitalist 
sense” seems to be a false equivalence.  
As Gilson notes, vitalism may be safely abandoned without harm to the 
Aristotelian system. As he notes: “The notion of ‘life’ is Platonist, not Aristotelian. 
Assuredly, Aristotle often speaks of ​zoe ​and of operations of life, but it is for him 
simply the proper action of living beings".  Put even more clearly, Feser writes,  
180
[N]othing that has been said has anything at all to do with vitalism... 
On the contrary, for the Aristotelian, most kinds of living things - plants and 
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non-human animals , for example - are entirely physical or corporeal. To 
181
deny that living things are irreducible is not to hold that they are non-physical, 
but entails merely that there are irreducibly different kinds of physical things.
  
182
Vitalism, consequently, must be treated as a separate thesis than the thesis that there 
is an irreducible unity, and consequent irreducible metaphysical distinction between 
a living animal and a non-living substance or a non-living artifact.  
Section II: Vogel, Machines, and Living Beings 
Vogel’s interest in all of this, however, is to deny the distinction between living 
things and artifacts to posit that artifacts have internal teleology just as living things 
do. In a sense, inverting the error of Paley. The eye and telescope are still the same 
kind of thing.  
 While Vogel is ready to accuse the advocates of “biocentric arguments” of 
asserting without evidence that artifacts lack intrinsic goods, he does not sufficiently 
establish his thesis. For Vogel wants to say (i) one can intelligibly speak of an internal 
teleology of artifacts and (ii) that the end of that teleology is not necessarily the 
interests of the one who built the artifact. Upon analysis, however, (i) seems to be a 
category mistake, and (ii) depends on (i) to hold true.  
What then is Vogel’s case for (i)? Vogel believes that unlike certain accidental 
unities (a pile of sand) a mall can be said to have a purpose since “it’s a commercial 
establishment whose goal is the selling of consumer goods at an operating profit. The 
181
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purpose is intrinsic to what a mall is".  Now one is tempted to be very skeptical of 
183
this as an intrinsic purpose. For, to say something is itself a venue for exchange 
relationships would seem to entail that its alleged intrinsic good is to be used 
instrumentally by vendors and consumers.  
In which case, Vogel actually re-introduced the extrinsic teleology of artifacts 
slyly and presented it as internal. Vogel, anticipating this objection, responds to the 
same point raised by Taylor. Taylor claims that for something to have some good as 
an intrinsic good, it must be possible to speak of that same good without references 
to other beings.  For example, an animal apparently undergoes its life-cycle for its 
184
own flourishing, and thus the process of maturation does not entail a reference to 
another being. Vogel is quick to retort, this seems to be a specious classification, for it 
would seem many living things have goods which reference other beings. The plant’s 
flourishing depends on its access to the sun, and the mere fact that a farmer is 
intentionally feeding an ox to strengthen it for work does not seem to make one 
question that the good of the oxen is its own.  However, both of these alleged 
185
counter-examples miss the mark. In the former case, the good of the plant is not in 
reference to the sun, since it is not the purpose for which it flourishes; rather, the sun 
is the efficient cause of the plant’s good. The second counter-example, on the other 
hand, mistakes a contingent connection (in this case the farmer benefits from the 
oxen flourishing) versus a necessary condition (on Vogel’s reading, a mall exists for 
the purpose of exchange, and thus ​definitionally ​requires consumers in order to 
realize its “intrinsic” good).  
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While Vogel’s counter-examples leave something to be desired, it will be 
useful to articulate more clearly the nature of the teleology of living things. While it is 
not exclusive to living beings to have internal teleology (even inanimate substances 
have internal principles of motion) it is unique to living beings to exemplify 
immanent causation ​. That is, living substances exhibit a type of “self-moving”​which 
“originates within the agent and terminates within it in a way that tends towards the 
agent’s own self-perfection of completion".  The example which Feser gives is 
186
digestion, which begins with eating and ends with the absorption of nutrients from 
the food into the animal.  This form of causation is uniquely present in living 
187
beings, and since it tends towards their perfection one can speak of their intrinsic 
good. 
This is in contrast to ​transeunt  causation​. Unlike immanent causation 188
transeunt causation terminates outside the agent, and is not inherently directed 
towards its perfection. For example, a boulder dislodged by some earthquake will 
continue to move downhill until it comes to a place of rest. Its descent, the speed of 
that descent, and its final termination are determined by the natural disposition of 
the boulder to move in a particular way. However, the rock’s movement cannot be 
said to terminate inside itself. While it tumbles, the rock imparts its momentum to 
everything which it comes in contact.  
A more complicated case would be the movement of fire. For fire is not alive, 
but it does consume and grow through consumption. It would seem then that at least 
this inanimate substance had some immanent causation. However, this would be an 
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equivocation on the use of consumption. An animal consumes a meal, digests it, and 
then uses it to grow or reserves the energy for later movements. Growth for a living 
being is clearly a case of immanent causation because it terminates in the increase of 
the body of the agent. However, when a fire consumes combustible material the 
movement always terminates outside the fire. The material being consumed is 
transformed into some other substance (e.g. wood is turned to ash) while light and 
heat are expelled. A fire may seem to grow, but in fact, it is just a larger reaction. 
More of the material may be burning at once, or there may be more oxygen in the air, 
but the fire is still an example of transeunt causation.  
Of course, an animal can tumble or, for that matter, be consumed by another 
animal. In both cases, the movements terminate outside of themselves. So while 
transeunt causation is not unique to inanimate things, immanent causation is 
uniquely the mark of animate substances.  
Returning again to Vogel, one may be tempted to ask whether a mall is truly 
an exception to the rule just stated. Vogel claims malls have intrinsic teleology as 
living things do. If this is true, then a mall must exhibit intrinsic purposiveness with 
the distinctively vital (at least ​allegedly ​distinctively vital) element of immanent 
causation. Nevertheless, regardless of initial plausibility, Vogel’s mall fails to provide 
an adequate counterexample to the exclusion of inanimate things from exhibiting 
immanent causation.  
By Vogel’s own definition, the allegedly intrinsic teleology of the mall is its 
orientation to the “selling of consumer goods at an operating profit”. There are a few 
ways to parse this description. Firstly, the point of the mall is to provide the 
consumer goods, whereas the profit is just a condition for its continued ability to  do 
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this. In which case the proper movement of the mall is the transformation of unsold 
consumer goods into sold consumer goods; what is potentially sold is made actually 
sold by the mall. In this case, the movement is clearly an example of transeunt 
teleology because the fundamental purpose of the mall is expulsive rather than 
self-fulfilling. 
Alternatively, one may understand Vogel as saying the intrinsic purpose of a 
mall is to generate profit, and the selling of consumer goods is just the means by 
which it does this. In this sense, the consumer goods may be akin to the lure of an 
angler fish which draws in its prey, except the mall is drawing in customers, or 
perhaps more specifically their money. This has the initial appearance of immanent 
causation, as the movement is now towards the growth of the mall’s revenue which 
seems a good candidate for an analogue with an animal’s growth. 
Unfortunately for Vogel, this is only when one speaks improperly. Malls do 
not take in profit. True, malls ​produce ​profit, but they are always producing profit for 
the various invested parties (e.g. vendors, employees, shareholders etc.). While the 
headline “West Edmonton Mall increased its annual profits by one billion dollars” 
could easily be imagined in any major Canadian newspaper, everyone would 
understand that the mall, ​qua ​the built-structure which Vogel is so interested in, did 
not retain any of that. It appears then Vogel’s own description of what a mall’s 
intrinsic teleology is meant to be is itself qualitatively different from the distinctive 
actions of living beings.  
Lest it be thought that Vogel merely chose a poor example, it will be useful to 
digress and show that the immanent/transeunt distinction is a matter of kind and 
not merely degree. For something to be an example of immanent causation, it must 
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be the movement of an agent which terminates in itself. While this may involve parts 
of an agent acting on other parts of the same agent, it is only on account of all active 
parts being part of the same agent for whose good they are acting that the action 
itself remains immanent. This is a matter of mere definition. 
In contrast, any action which is performed by the agent outside of the agent 
itself cannot be said to be an example of immanent causation. This is true even if the 
movement were to set in motion a series which terminated again in the agent. Thus, 
an agent which acts upon patient for the sake of the patient  wherein the agent and 
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patient are not part of some single substance has excluded the possibility of 
immanent causation already. Therefore, no number of transeunt causes can amount 
to a single immanent cause.  
In consequence, anything which is actually an example of immanent causation 
must be irreducible to transeunt causes. Hence, anything ​apparently ​an example of 
immanent causation which is, in fact, reducible to transeunt causes will not be a 
counterexample to the principle that only living things exhibit immanent causation. I 
argue that this is the case with every artifact, because no artifact exists as a single 
substance. 
It will be useful here to visit Oderberg’s example of a thermostat. A thermostat 
appears to be an example of immanent causation in artifacts. The system acts on 
itself by, first, sensing that the air around is of a different temperature than its 
setting, and secondly, adjusting the air around itself to clear its sensors. Its 
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 For the sake of the patient does not here imply any kind of will or intention for the patient, but 
merely means to impart to the patient something which does not enter back into the agent. For this 
reason digestion is an example of immanent causation not transeunt. As the various parts of an 
animal’s digestive system act upon the food consumed they are working to assimilate the nourishment 
into the agent. Digestion cannot be thought to be for the pursuit of an external patient, but is done by 
an agent for itself.  
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movement of cooling the air is to restore the proper settings for its sensors. However, 
while this is one description of the actions of the thermostat, everything just 
mentioned can be described by transeunt causation. As Oderberg explains: 
For instance, we can say truly that a thermostat adjusts the state of its 
system in response to a change in temperature: this is a kind of 
self-adjustment. Yet it is wholly explicable in transient terms: the internal 
thermometer reacts to a change in temperature which causes the mercury 
switch (in a simple device) to change position which causes contact between 
wires, which creates a circuit that causes an appliance, such as a heater, to 
turn on. When the temperature reaches a certain level, the switch changes 
position again, thus breaking the circuit and thereby turning off the appliance.
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That is, even in complicated machines which appear to self-regulate, it is only by 
means of the transient causation of its parts working on each other that the system 
can self-regulate ​. It is pr​ecisely because artifacts are not substances that immanent 
causation is not just a contingent impossibility, but a metaphysical impossibility.  
Since the parts of a machine are each a substance ​in act ​(rather than merely 
virtually as the atoms of a water molecule) the machine’s movements ​qua ​the 
machine will always be accidental. Some part of the artifact may move ​per se ​but the 
motion of the various parts will be concomitant and consequently only accidental. 
Consequently, it is impossible for a machine to exhibit immanent causation, because 
in its very nature its only movements are not moving itself as a whole but only 
actions taken upon its parts and by its parts.  
190
 Oderberg, ​Real Essentialism​, 196. 
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Conclusion: 
Despite Vogel’s attempt, he has not shown satisfactorily that there is a sense in 
which artifacts possess internal teleology. The close link between a unitary 
substantial form, internal teleology, and immanent causation entails that living 
beings will always be ​qualitatively ​different from artifacts. Further, whereas 
immanent causation is a sure sign of life, real internal teleology is a consequence of a 
unitary substantial form. If something lacks the unity characteristic of a substance it 
cannot be said to have the natural principles and properties of a substance. Whereas 
there is something ingenious about the skill with which humans, and even 
non-human animals, can arrange other things into useful arrangements, these 
arrangements in themselves lack the same principles of internal teleology that even 
non-living substances have since the parts of an artifact will always be themselves 
actually distinct substances rather thing a single being with an internal teleology.  
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CHAPTER VII: A FINAL SURVEY 
In summary, Vogel’s central thesis is that the concept of nature is so 
problematic that it should be abandoned. To demonstrate this point, he describes in 
detail two definitions of nature which he takes to have notable currency in 
contemporary environmental discourse. The first, Nature(1) is the result of dividing 
nature from what is human. Nature(1) become pristine wilderness which has never 
been impacted by anything human; it is nature in its most independent state. The 
second notion is that of Nature(2) wherein what is natural is identified as what is 
physical. The relevant contrast then is not between the human and the natural, but 
between the natural and the supernatural (or at least the preternatural).  
Ultimately, Vogel finds both of these views to be fatally flawed. If Nature(1) is 
appealed to in environmental discourse, it will provide little light on how human 
beings ought to conduct themselves in relation to the environment. Firstly, because if 
nature is definitionally non-human, conservation projects carried out by ​humans 
become contradictions in terms. Any project undertaken in the name of nature 
conservation will extinguish the naturalness it wishes to protect.  
Nature(2) does not fare much better. If everything physical is natural, then all 
things from trees to freeways are equally natural as they are equally physical. Human 
beings do not have the power to turn some physical thing into a non-physical thing 
and thus for human intents and purposes nature is an invincible feature of the world.  
Consequently, both Nature(1) and Nature(2) are ​useless ​as guiding notions for 
environmental philosophy. However, Vogel sees something even more problematic in 
contemporary conceptions of nature (particularly Nature(1)) in that these notions 
run the risk of being ideological. They are ideological in the sense that each  
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“expresses a mistaken view of the world that at the same time reveals something deep 
about ​our​ world, the particular social order that we inhabit".  This is because the 191
concerns about nature are not really about conserving some kind of nature, but about 
distracting society from the true built environment in which it lives. By idealizing the 
pristine as natural, the urban or even rural environments in which people live are 
seen as not worth preserving. As Callicot notes “If we conceived of wilderness as a 
static benchmark of pristine nature in reference to which all human modifications 
may be judged to be more or less degradations”.  This buttresses the ​status quo ​of 192
contemporary society by preventing any efforts to improve the environment in which 
human beings live. Neither Nature(1) nor Nature(2) can serve as the basis for any 
social critique which would lead to an improvement in human living conditions.  
In contrast, I have brought forth an Aristotelian notion of nature derived 
primarily from Aristotle’s own work and the subsequent tradition. For consistency, I 
have deemed this “Nature(3)”. Nature(3) neither divides the natural and non-natural 
along the lines of human versus non-human nor physical versus non-physical, but 
rather between what is substantial and what is accidental. When one’s notion of 
nature is formed along these lines the problems which Vogel brings up against the 
very idea of a notion of nature are dissolved.  
Firstly, the qualms one may have about Nature(1) leading to a paralysis of 
environmental conservation are put to rest once one realizes that Nature(3) is not so 
concerned with human interference as to deem every human action inherently 
unnatural. To feed an animal or to water a plant is rather an aid to the nature of that 
particular thing rather than a hindrance. There is nothing privileged about the state 
191 ​Vogel, ​Thinking Like a Mall​, 93. 
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the animal or plant would have been in without human beings that excludes other 
states as being equally or even more natural. Thus no contradiction arises per se in 
humans choosing to put effort into preserving some particular forest or aquatic 
habitat. 
Furthermore, as Nature(3) only applies to those motions which given things 
are disposed towards, that is those motions which they exhibit spontaneously, it does 
not follow that absolutely everything in the universe is natural. It may be the case 
that nothing is entirely apart from some natural object (since ultimately natural 
objects provide some level of a foundation for composition) but it may be the case 
that multiple natural objects conglomerate in a non-natural way, e.g., a heap of 
stones or a tangle of vines. In this category, one may place also the more obvious 
examples of artifacts (computers, cars, houses etc). This is not, however, because said 
artifacts are composed by human beings, but rather because they lack the integration 
of parts that occurs in true natural substances. Nature(3) will readily grant that water 
produced in a lab is natural, but would not grant the status of nature to a beaver’s 
dam, a heap of stones, or a bookshelf for the same reasons. The water, regardless of 
its human origin, exhibits the characteristic unity of a natural substance while the 
other things do not.  
If Nature(3) can avoid the objections which Vogel levels against Nature(1) and 
Nature(2), it remains to be seen if it escapes a charge of being ideology. As Vogel sets 
out the conditions for being ideology, the first is that the ideological view be false. In 
this respect, it is at least plausible that Nature(3) not meet this criterion, because as I 
have argued it is a view not susceptible to the criticisms of other concepts of nature, 
and it is also not caught in the brief asides Vogel makes elsewhere in his book to 
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Aristotle. While Nature(3) is an expansion upon the theories of pre-modern ideas 
about nature as those held by the ancient Greeks and the medievals, it does not 
follow that that automatically disqualifies it from contemporary discourse. Whereas 
something like “vitalism” is condemned by contemporary science, this idea has only 
been associated with Aristotle as a matter of misconception.  
Beyond the issue of whether or not Nature(3) is plausible, it would still not be 
ideological, even if it was false. This is on two accounts. Nature(3) does negate the 
status quo​. For much the same reasons that Nature(3) cannot be identified with 
Nature(1), Nature(3) also does not lead to the same ideological problems that 
Nature(1) does. Since Nature(3) does not ​exclude human beings from consideration 
of the natural, it also does not exclude human environments from considerations of 
environmental conservation.  
Furthermore, as the normative consequences of Nature(3) are derived from 
privileging the natural motions and self-fulfillment of substances (including the 
living human substance), there is room for the consideration of true human interests. 
As it is an essential feature of an ideological view that it be not only deeply 
entrenched in society but also that it be contrary to the interests of those deceived by 
it. Whereas, Nature(1) creates a hyper-focus on the interests of a mostly fictional 
pristine nature rather than the interests of human beings, Nature(3) invites people to 
consider the ​objective ​conditions of their own flourishing.  
Furthermore, it is even possible to speak of concerns for the goods of other 
non-human entities conditions as compatible with a general interest in human 
flourishing. Nature(3) does not lead to the postlapsarian abandonment of 
environments in which humans live which Callicott feared, but rather allows for 
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consideration of multiple kinds of interests. It is true, I have only argued for a 
presumptive weight to be granted to the goods of other beings, at least in so far as it 
comes to human decision making. Since human beings are the ones making human 
decisions they must make these decisions in light of true human interests (which 
relate to true human flourishing). Therefore, where human needs and the interests of 
something else conflict, human interests must be given priority, but this does not 
mean the interests of other things are irrelevant. The interests of non-human entities 
provide a non-arbitrary good which demands respect at least in so far as it ought not 
to be overridden without ​some ​justification. The overriding cause must be at least 
equal to the good which is cancelled.  
While this analysis does not exclude the goods of non-living substances, it 
applies primarily and most especially to living beings. A living organism exhibits 
certain forms of motion and causation that allow one to say it is self-actualizing its 
own perfection in a mode unique to living beings. Vogel denies this and attempts a 
reductio ad absurdum wherein a mall is taken to be just as much an agent of its own 
good as any living being. 
To this end, Vogel defends an account of intrinsic teleology. Intrinsic teleology 
is itself very Aristotelian, but Aristotle did not believe that artifacts had the kind of 
teleology which Vogel wishes to attribute to the mall. Mistakenly, Vogel attributes 
this distinction to “vitalism” which as already mentioned is nothing but a 
strawperson.  
Aristotle’s distinction between the teleology of living organisms and 
technology is a consequence of the aforementioned distinction between those 
configurations which occur on account of forces outside of a thing and the 
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substantive unity derived from a thing’s own inner principles. Vogel does not notice 
this difference and in consequence, overestimates the thoroughness of his own 
counter-examples. In the end, Vogel’s ​reductio ​in which he suggests a mall has as 
much a good of its own as a living organism fails on two accounts.  
Firstly, even Vogel is not able to account for a good which is intrinsic to the 
mall. Instead, he defines the good of the malls in a way analyzable as “the good of the 
mall is to produce goods for some group of people”. This is very distinct from the 
good of say a fawn to grow into a deer, since it is the good of self-perfection which is 
being realized.  
Secondly, Vogel’s account fails to consider the qualitative difference in the 
forms of causality manifested by inanimate and animate things. In the former cause, 
actions are always extrinsic. An inanimate agent is one that acts in a ​transeunt 
manner. That is it serves as a cause when it is affecting other things, and does not act 
upon itself for its own perfection. This is in contrast to animate things which in some 
of their motions exhibit immanent causality, wherein they act upon themselves to 
obtain their self-perfection.  
When these distinctions are present, Vogel’s mall ​reductio ​does not hold. 
Since the mall is not a single unitary substance, it must be understood as a 
configuration of a variety of underlying substances. However, since each of those 
substances is acting on other substances to produce the kinds of complex events (e.g. 
revenue generation) which Vogel links to the mall’s good, it follows that the good in 
question is the by-product of rather complicated chains of transeunt causality. Since 
transeunt causality is qualitatively different from immanent causality, it follows that 
no amount of transeunt causality, no matter how complex, can ever amount to 
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immanent causality. Consequently, the mall does not exhibit the essential features of 
an animate being.  
It does not appear then that Vogel has done enough to establish the thesis that 
artifacts have the internal teleology Vogel suggests they have. Even though life is not 
a prerequisite for an internal teleology, Vogel’s suggestion that a mall had internal 
teleology would not be saved by an appeal to the type of intrinsic teleology found in 
inanimate beings. For just as in the case of animate beings, inanimate beings only 
derive an internal teleology from ​what ​they are, which is to say their singular 
substantial form. The mall as a complex configuration of distinct substances cannot 
exhibit the intrinsic teleology of either an animate or inanimate substance.  
Thus, while Vogel does some important work in clearing the grounds for a new 
conception of nature, he does not adequately rule out the possibility of a coherent 
Aristotelian account of nature rising to take the place of the problematic conceptions. 
While one can agree with Vogel that Nature(1) and Nature(2) are both less than 
useful for contemporary environmental discourse, his criticisms of these notions 
should not be taken as an end to the very concept of nature but as an invitation 
towards a renewed understanding. Nature(3) need not be accepted on blind faith, 
nor seen as the end of the discussion, but as of ​Thinking Like a Mall ​it seems one of 
the plausible alternatives left to Vogel’s radical constructivism.   
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